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Articles

The Constitutionality of Code of Civil

Procedure Section 1094.5 (d):
Effluvium From An Old FountainHead of Corruption

B. ABBOTT GOLDBERG*

In California,judicialreview of administrativedecisions has become
notoriousfor the surprisesit holds....

1

At the request of the California Hospital Association, and despite the
opinion of the Legislative Counsel that it is unconstitutional, the Governor signed SB 1472,2 which adds a new subsection (d) to Code of
Civil Procedure Section 1094.5.1 New subsection (d) is so innocuous on
its face that it escaped this journal's comment on "significant laws" enacted during the 1978 session.4 Nevertheless, it is a remarkable novelty
because it is the first time since Section 1094.5 was enacted in 1945 that
the legislature stated in that section which of the two scopes of judicial
review codified therein is applicable to any particular form of activity.
In substance new Section 1094.5(d) provides that judicial review in
*

B.A., Michigan, 1937; LL.B., Harvard, 1940; Judge of the California Superior Court, Re-

tired.
1. President'sPage, 2 STAN. L. REv. 255, 258 (1950).
2. CAL. STATS. 1978, c. 1348, §1 at - (enacting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §1094.5(d)); Cal.
Office of Legislative Counsel, Report on Enrolled Bill, SB 1472, Sept. 20, 1978; Letter from Joseph
A. Saunders Esq., to Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Sept. 26, 1978, (copy on file at the Pacfic
Law Journal).
3. All references to code sections are to the California Codes.
4. 10 PAC. LJ., REviEw oF SELECTED 1978 CALIFORNLA LEGISLATION 247, 255 (1979).
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cases "arising from private hospital boards" shall be limited in scope to
determining if the board acted on "substantial evidence," thereby precluding the superior court from exercising "its independent judgment
on the evidence," the other alternative codified in old Section
1094.5(c). 5 The purpose of Section 1094.5(d) was to alter the result of

Anton v. San Antonio Community Hospital,6 which held, interalia, that
Section 1094.5(c) required the superior court "to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence" in reviewing the dismissal of a physician
by a private hospital from its medical staff.
Although Anton is a lawyer's field day, it has not aroused much comment. It raises questions ranging from a high philosophical level down
to routine techniques of statutory interpretation. For example, it illustrates the dilemma between "value-oriented jurisprudence" 7 and "neulaw."' It raises the problem of
tral principles of constitutional
"constitutionalizing" 9 private agencies. It poses several questions as to
"what process is 'due?' "10 on such issues as the retroactive application
5. The statement in Tex-Cal LandManagement, Inc. v. AgriculturalLabor RelationsBd, 24
Cal. 3d 335, 346, 595 P.2d 579, 585, 156 Cal. Rptr. 1, 7 (1979), "Our holding does not, of course,
affect review of administrative findings where the Legislature has left the choice of standard to the
courts [e.g., as in §1094.5]," is misleading because it ignores the fact that new §1094.5(d) would
deny the courts a choice of standard in cases of private hospitals. Section 1094.5(d) excepts cases
alleging discrimination by hospitals against podiatrists in violation of California Health and
Safety Code Section 1316. The intrusion of this specialized subject into the more general bill may
be an example of the "substantial representation" that "powerful economic forces can obtain.
in the halls of the Legislature .
Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 142, 481 P.2d 242, 250, 93
Cal. Rptr. 234, 242 (1971).
6. 19 Cal. 3d 802, 567 P.2d 1162, 140 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1977); see The Supreme Court of Cali.
fornia 1976-1977, 66 CALIF. L. REv. 180, 201-14 (1978).
7. At least one "value system proceeds from the assumption that a value is a 'desired
event.'" E. BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE 149 (rev'd ed. 1974). "[I]t may also happen that a
judge . . . will determine that orderly continuity must in a particular case yield to imperative
requirements of justice." Id at 249.
8. Constitutionality cannot be tested merely by moral approval or disapproval of the result
reached. If the courts are to function as something besides "naked power organs" their decisions
should rest on "reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result
that is involved." Wechsler, TowardNeutralPrncolesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1,
19 (1959). See also id at 10-20. "Neutral principles [foreclose] ad hoc constitutional judgments
which express merely the judge's transient feeling of what is fair, convenient, or congenial in the
particular circumstances of litigation.. . . A neutral principle... is an intellectually coherent
statement of the reason for a result which in like cases will produce a like result, whether or not it
is immediately agreeable or expedient." A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 59 (1962).
See also id at 2, 49-65.
9. The quoted word in from Goss v. Lapez, 419 U.S. 565, 595 (1975) (Powell, J. dissenting).
The subject is opened in Ewing, Sunlight in the Salt Mines, 29 HARv. L. SCH. BULL. 18 (1977), and
D. EWING, FREEDOM INSIDE THE ORGANIZATION (1977). Ezekial v. Winkley, 20 Cal. 3d 267, 572
P.2d 32, 142 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1977), seems to be an independent example of Ewing's thesis. Other
examples are Gay Law Students Ass v. Pacfc Telephone & Telegraph Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595
P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979), and Robins Y.PruneyardShopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592
P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979).
10. The phrase is from Memphis Light, Gas & Water Di. V. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 12 (1978). See
also Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans Hosp., 537 F.2d 361, 367 (9th Cir. 1976). Anton, in conformity with prior California cases, uses the expression" 'minimal requisites of fair procedure required
by established common law principles."' 19 Cal. 3d at 825, 567 P.2d at 1175, 140 Cal. Rptr. at
455. See Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Socty of Orthodontists, 12 Cal. 3d 541, 550 n.7, 526 P.2d 253, 259
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of procedural regulations, the right of the doctor to participate in the
selection of the membership of the reviewing committee, the right to
counsel, and the incidence of the burden of proof. All of these issues
were resolved in favor of the hospital except for the holding that the
"independent judgment" test under Section 1094.5(c) was applicable.
And this holding leads to the principal question to be discussed. Is the
holding on Section 1094.5(c) merely a statutory interpretation, a construction of legislative intent which the legislature could alter, or is it a
holding of constitutional dimensions and, therefore, beyond legislative
change?
Were one to apply "neutral principles" to California constitutional
law, the logical conclusion would be that Section 1094.5(d) is partially
unconstitutional. But the relevant California constitutional law is
based on false premises, which, once accepted, cannot be corrected by
correct logic. Were all the false premises to be rejected, the logical conclusion would be that Section 1094.5(d) is valid and from a reasonable,
if not universally accepted, practical point of view desirable.
A plurality opinion, published after this paper was prepared for the
press, Tex-Cal Land Management, Inc. v. AgriculturalLabor Relations

Board,1 indicates not only that the court is still value-oriented but also
that its values may be changing. The plurality, at least, rejected the
false premise that granting an administrative agency the authority to
make final findings of fact was a grant of "judicial power" that inevitably violated the separation of powers provision and the judiciary article
of the California constitution. But the plurality ignored, if it did not
conceal, the fact that the prior cases also held that the due process
clause of the California constitution forbade such grants of factual
finality. Thus the best one can say of Tex-Cal, considering its ambiguous status and its elision of what could be a controlling consideration,
is that it permits, but does not necessarily compel, the conclusion that
Section 1094.5(d) is constitutional.
n.7, 116 Cal. Rptr. 245, 251 n.7 (1974). Professor Tribe's explanation of "state action," discussed
hereafter, makes this distinction between "due process" and "common law. . . fair procedure"

unnecessary.
11. 24 Cal. 3d 335, 595 P.2d 579, 156 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1979). Only three justices concurred
without qualification. One "concurred in the judgment." Two "concurred in the result." And
one dissented in part and otherwise "concurred in the conclusions reached by the majority [sic]
opinion." Id. at 356, 595 P.2d at 591, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 13. Since there is only one opinion, and it

is not a majority opinion unless the concurrence makes it one, the reference to the "majority
opinion" is tantalizingly obscure. It is assumed that had an unqualified concurrence, except as to
the portions dissented from been intended, the justice would have said so and not merely "concurred in the conclusions."
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4NTON: THE COURT'S DESIRE TO AVOID INCONGRUITY

For the purposes of the sole question of the applicability of Section
1094.5(c), the facts inAnton are simple. Dr. Anton had been a member
of the medical staff of the private hospital for some 13 years during
which he had been subjected to various sanctions for failure to complete hospital records. In 1973 the hospital found that he had been
guilty of both over- and underutilization of the hospital, poor medical
judgment, and continuing incompleteness of physical examinations and
medical histories. Pursuant to Business and Professions Code Section
2392.5(a), the hospital refused to reappoint him to the staff for 1974.
Dr. Anton brought a proceeding under Code of Civil Procedure Section 1085, the traditional form of mandate used to compel readmission
to a private group. In such a proceeding "the court [below] properly
' 2
refused to pass on the truth of [the] charges against the plaintiff.' If
the witnesses before the private group presented evidence that did not
have to be disbelieved, "the decision of the [private group] as to the
13
merits of the charges was controlling upon the trial court and jury.'
What the court reviews in such cases is not the credibility of the evidence but its legal sufficiency to support the action taken.' 4 This is a
form of statement of the "substantial evidence" test. The Court of Appeal held that this test was correctly applied in reviewing the failure to

reappoint Dr. Anton, and he lost, at least temporarily.' 5 The holding
conforms with what had been the common understanding of the law.
As Judge Deering wrote before Anton was decided by the supreme
court:

Code of Civil Procedure §1094.5 has never been held to apply to
judicial review of such actions [of private organizations];16the section's
inapplicability appears implicit in its historical context.
"Never" lasted from May 1977, when Judge Deering's statement was
published, until August 1977, when the supreme court demoted it to an
assumption and declared: "[We] find nothing in the statutory language
12. Cason v. Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 37 Cal. 2d 134, 147, 231 P.2d 6, 13 (1951). The
opinion was written by Gibson, C.J., who, as Chairman of the Judicial Council, was a principal
proponent of Section 1094.5, which had been on the books for several years.

13. McConville v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, 106 Cal. App. 696, 699, 289 P. 852, 854
(1930).
14. Smetherham v. Laundry Workers' Union, 44 Cal. App. 2d 131, 111 P.2d 948 (1941).

15. Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 127 Cal. Rptr. 394, 398 (1976) (opinion superseded by grant of hearing by the supreme court). The fact that at some point Dr. Anton switched

from a request for relief under Section 1085 to relief under Section 1094.5 is immaterial, 19 Cal.
3d at 813-14, 567 P.2d at 1167, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 447; 5 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE,
ExtraordinaryWrits §§183, 184 (2d ed. 1971), unless the supreme court wishes to make the label
on the petition significant. Standard Oil Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 6 Cal. 2d 557, 59 P.2d
119 (1936). See note 43 infra.

16.

CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUS,

§2.10D (Supp. 1977).
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or supporting legislative materials which would lead us to accept that
assumption as warranted."17 And with this language Anton became an
example of "value-oriented" jurisprudence. The desired value is to
reach similar results in what the court considered similar cases. In a
favorite phrase of the author of the opinion, the court looked at "the
realities of the situation."' 8 Thus it adverted to the "practical consideration" that had the case involved a public hospital under the Local
Hospital District Law, Section 1094.5 would have been applicable.19
And it likened private hospitals to public hospitals.
For many years an accepted proposition of California law has been
that "a [private] society acting upon the expulsion of a member is a
quasi-judicial body and its hearing is a quasi-judicial hearing."2
From this Pinsker v. Pacfc Coast Society of Orthodontists1 derived the

rule that a member of" 'an unincorporated association may not be suspended or expelled'" without being afforded procedural fairness,22 a
rule which Anton says "insures that such a hearing will be accompanied
by the related procedural protections requisite to Section 1094.5 review." 3 And Anton then concluded:
It would be incongruous, we believe, to hold that the decisions of
private hospital boards, which are required by the same decision
[Pinsker v. Pacfc Coast Society of Orthodontists]to be based upon a

hearing of substantially identical scope and purport, were to be subject to some different form of review. 24
Had the court been writing on a clean slate, avoidance of the incongruity would have presented no problem. But as in Strumsky v. San
Diego County Employees Retirement Association,2 5 where it held that
there was no longer "any rational or legal justification" fort distinguishing between the scope of judicial review of local and statewide adminis17. Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 19 Cal. 3d 802, 816, 567 P.2d 1162, 1169, 140
Cal. Rptr. 442, 449 (1977).
18. Id at 824, 567 P.2d at 1174, 140 Cal.Rptr. at 454; Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Ass'n, 11 Cal.3d 28, 45, 520 P.2d 29, 41, 112 Cal. Rptr. 805, 816 (1974).
19. 19 Cal. 3d at 818, 567 P.2d at 1170, 140 Cal Rptr. at 450.
20. Ascherman v. San Francisco Medical Soe'y, 39 Cal. App. 3d 623, 649, 114 Cal. Rptr. 681,
697 (1974).
21. 12 Cal. 3d 541, 526 P.2d 253, 116 Cal. Rptr. 245 (1974) (Pinsker II).
22. Id at 552-53, 526 P.2d at 262, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 254.
23. Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 19 Cal. 3d 802, 818, 567 P.2d 1162, 1170, 140
Cal. Rptr. 442, 450 (1977). See also id at 815, 567 P.2d at 1168-69, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 448-49.
24. Id at 818, 567 P.2d at 1170, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 450. The incongruity apparently remains as
regards the University of California hospitals. Although an untenured pharmacist's assistant may
not be dismissed without "minimal due process safeguards," e.g., adequate notice of the charges
and the reasons therefore, Mendoza v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 78 Cal. App. 3d 168, 172, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 117, 119 (1978), the scope of judicial review is the substantial evidence test, because the
university is "a statewide administrative agency possessing adjudicatory powers derived from the
Constitution as to the problems and purposes of its personnel." Ishimatsu v. Regents of Univ. of
Cal., 266 Cal. App. 2d 854, 864, 72 Cal. Rptr. 756, 763 (1968) (dismissal of untenured medical
librarian).
25. 11 Cal. 3d 28, 32, 520 P.2d 29, 31, 112 Cal. Rptr. 805, 807 (1974).
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trative agencies, the court had to clean the slate itself. The erasers it
used in A4nton were the obliteration of history and the alteration of the
meaning of language, particularly the word "administrative." A review
of the history is necessary to the understanding of the change in usage.
And if the change in usage is taken at face value, new Section 1094.5(d)
is partially unconstitutional unless Tex-Cal is authoritative.
A GLANCE AT ANTON'S POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL
BACKGROUND

The history of the constitutional issue raised by Section 1094.5(d)
can be judicially documented in California from 1936, but its actual
history may have begun even earlier. At some point in the first quarter
or third of this century the courts became aware of and afraid that a
"huge administrative. . . burgeoning bureaucracy would endanger the
prevailing concepts of individual rights., 2 6 That fear was not peculiar
to the United States, and its tone may be inferred from The New Despotism, written by Lord Hewart of Bury, Lord Chief Justice of England, in 1929. This was the book form of his "series of sensational
essays on the administrative practices of the government" that had startled newspaper readers.27 The New Despotism may have been available
to the justices of the California Supreme Court, because a copy was in
the court's library as late as 1944.21 Whether read or not, Lord
Hewart's fears resembled some of the fears of the opponents of the
Roosevelt Administration that began in 1933. And in 1936, while the
hostility to "administrative law" was in full ferment, California had a
supreme court described as "bent upon nullifying and/or preventing
the advent of a little New Deal in California with its usual incidence of
'29
bureaucratic control and regulation.
The instrument the court used for its purpose was StandardOil Cornpan), v. State Boardof Equalization,3 0 a case which must be one of the
outstanding departures from "neutral principles" of constitutional law.
The mode the court chose was to hold that certiorari, the common law
26. Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 142, 481 P. 2d 242, 250, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 242 (1974).
27. Smith, Book Review, 39 YALE L.. 763 (1930).
28. This statement is based on personal recollection from reading parts there. See JUDICIAL
COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, TENTH BIENNIAL REPORT 9 (1944) [hereinafter cited as TENTH BIEN-

NIAL REPORT].
29. Netterville, JudicialReview: The "Independent Judgment" Anomaly, 44 CALIF. L. REV.
262, 264 (1956); see Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 159, 481 P.2d 242, 255, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 255
(1971) (Burke, J., concurring). See also the pejorative reference to the "evil of administrative
action which must be guarded against," Laisne v. California State Bd. of Optometry, 19 Cal. 2d
831, 846, 123 P.2d 457, 466 (1942), and McGovney's references to "persons who dislike administrative agencies" and "opponents of administrative agencies," McGovney, The CalpforniaChaosin
CourtReview of Decisions ofStatedministrative.4gencies,15 S. CAL. L. REV. 391, 411 (1942).
30. 6 Cal. 2d 557, 59 P.2d 119 (1936).
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writ used since the admission of the state to review quasi-judicial ac-

tions of administrative agencies, could no longer be so used because to
allow such use would be an acknowledgment that "judicial power" had
been vested in such agencies and such investiture would be unconstitutional.3 StandardOil is not only unprecedented, it is contrary to the
historical precedents. As early as 1850 California adopted the common
law of England as the rule of decision,32 and at common law certiorari
was the common means of bringing the record of the proceedings of an
"inferior jurisdiction" before the King's Bench "to inspect the record,
and see whether they keep themselves within the limits of their jurisdiction. '33 It was used to review not only the actions of courts but also of
commissioners of sewers, the censors of the Royal College of Physicians and like bodies, which are not judicial but proceed on records
susceptible to judicial review.34
The English law was summarized in Local Government Board v. Arlidge."
The power of obtaining a writ of certiorari is not limited to judicial
acts or orders in a strict sense, that is to say, acts or orders of a Court

of law sitting in a judicial capacity. It extends to the acts and orders
of a competent authority which has power to impose a liability or to
give a decision which determines the rights or property of the affected parties.35
The California law, later stated in Suckow v. Alderson, was virtually
identical:
[T]ribunals such as the board of medical examiners . . .are not

courts in the strict sense; they are not exercising 'the judicial power of
the state' as that phrase is used in the constitution conferring judicial
power upon courts. . . .[wihere a board has exercised quasi-judicial power. . . its decisions are subject to revision by way of certio36

rari.

31. The story of Standard Oil and its progeny has been told so completely and definitively

that any detailed repetition is superfluous. Laisne v. California State Bd. of Optometry, 19 Cal. 2d
831, 851, 123 P.2d 457,469 (1942) (Gibson, C.J., dissenting); TENTH BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note
28 at 26-28, 137-43 (1944) (Mr. Ralph N. Kleps was the principal author, id at 9); Kleps, Certiorar)ifedMandamus. Court Review of CalforniaAdministrative Decisions1939-49, 2 STAN. L. REV.
285 (1950); Kleps, Certiorarfled Mandamus Reviewed- The Courts and CaliforniaAdministrative
Dedsions-1949-1959,12 STAN. L. REv. 554 (1960). It is synopsized in Bixby v. Pierno,4 Cal. 3d

130, 137-40, 481 P.2d 242, 247-49, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 239-41 (1971).
32. Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 379-87, 10 P. 674,746-51 (1886) (discussing what is now CAL.
CIV. CODE §22.2).
33. Groenvelt v. Burwell, 91 Eng. Rep 134 (K.B. 1700).
34. Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal [1952] 1 K.B. 338, 351 (Denning, L.J,) (certiorari held applicable to correct error of law and not limited to jurisdictional errors); A. DENNING, THE DISCIPLINE OF LAW 63-66 (1979). "Northumberland... transformed the

law about statutory tribunals." Id at 66. I am indebted to Mr. Geoffrey Eisen, A.R.P.S., for these
references.
35. [19151 A.C. 120, 140.
36. 182 Cal. 247, 250, 187 P. 965, 966 (1920).
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The failure of the court in Standard Oil to consider Local Government Boardv. Arlidge may be significant. Although the case was familiar to American students of administrative law,37 one might charitably
suppose that it was not called to the court's attention, because the court
showed no reluctance to consider the English precedents when it served
its purposes to do so. 3 8 On the other hand, if the supposition that the

court had been affected by The New Despotism has any validity, it may
have deliberately ignored Local Government Board v.39Arlidge because
the case was particularly outrageous to Lord Hewart.

But the failure to dispose of Suckow v. Alderson admits of no charitable explanation. It was cited in StandardOil and disposed of as con-

flicting with other cases. But the other cases did not involve the
exercise of quasi-judicial authority, and so the asserted conflict was imaginary, not real. n°

Thus Netterville's explanation that the court was bent on reaching a
preconceived result seems credible. 4 ' The court dispelled its fears of

administrative usurpation of judicial powers by ignoring history and
tinkering with terminology, and thus set a precedent for the use of like
techniques in later cases.4 2
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS

StandardOil, on its face, involved only a procedural problem, a mistaken choice of remedy, which could easily have been solved by granting the proper remedy.4 3 But instead of following this obvious and
even then familiar path, the next step was to hold that prohibition, like
certiorari, was also an improper means of reviewing administrative revocation of a license, because such revocation was not the exercise of

'judicial power," and prohibition lay only to review the exercise of 'ju37. F. FRANKFURTER & J. DAVISON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 576
(1932). See also Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 482 (1936).
38. Drummey v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors, 13 Cal. 2d 75, 82, 87 P.2d 848, 852 (1939).
39. The effect of the decision seems to be that where judicial functions are vested in a
Minister or Government Department, parties to the proceedings have none of the securities against injustice which they enjoy in judicial proceedings before the Courts.
G. HEWART, THE NEW DESPOTISM 172-73 (1929).
40. Laisne v. California State Bd. of Optometry, 19 Cal. 2d 831, 852-54, 864-65, 123 P.2d 457,
469-70, 475-76 (1942) (Gibson, CJ., dissenting); TENTH BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 28 at 138
n.31 (1944). Suckow v. Alderson was not expressly overruled. It seems to be among "some cases"
which "must be deemed to have been overruled" by StandardOil. Drummey v. State Bd. of
Funeral Directors, 13 Cal. 2d 75, 81, 87 P.2d 848, 852 (1939).
41. See note 29 supra.
42. Comment, AdministrativeAdiidicatlon in Californiaatd its Review by the Writ of Cerliorari,25 CALIF. L. REv. 694, 711 (1937).
43. Laisne v. California State Bd. of Optometry, 19 Cal. 2d at 850, 854, 869, 123 P.2d at 468,
470, 478 (1942) (Gibson, C.J., dissenting); Van Hoosear v. Railroad Comm'n, 189 Cal. 228, 236,
207 P. 903, 906 (1922); People v. Board of Supervisors, 27 Cal. 655, 671-72, 673 (1865); CAL. CIv.
PROC. CODE §580; 5 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, ExtraordinaryWrits §§183, 184 (2d ed.
1971). See note 15 supra.
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dicial power."'
The constitutional implication of the cases denying
the availability of certiorari and prohibition was that the delegation of
fact-finding authority to administrative agencies violated the separation
45
of powers and judiciary clauses of the California constitution.
FEDERAL AND STATE DUE PROCESS

If the only question were the separation of powers of government
under the state constitution, there would seem to be no doubt that new
Section 1094.5(d) is constitutional, because there is no requirement that
the powers of a private group be similarly separated. But the cases
involve more than the constitutional separation of powers; they also
46
involve due process. Drummey v. State Board of FuneralDirectors
held that mandate or mandamus was the proper remedy to review the
action of an administrative agency of statewide jurisdiction exercising
what had heretofore been considered "quasi-judicial power." But
Drummey went further and held that if
finality is given to [administrative] findings based on conflicting evidence ... [it] would probably violate the due process clause of the
federal Constitution ....
[I]f the courts in reviewing the administrative board's actions do not exercise an independent judgment on the
facts as well as on the law, then the party adversely affected, at least
where constitutional rights are involved, has been deprived of due
process. 4 7
Within less than four months what was only probable in Drummey
was converted to "mandatory" by dictum in McDonough v. Goodeell.48
Dictum because MeDonough v. Goodcell did not involve what the court
considered existing "valuable property rights," a license, but involved
only an application for a license. The history of MeDonough is the
source of the "fountainhead of corruption" used in the title of this paper. But McDonough, with its distinction between the treatment afforded licensees and applicants, is so quixotic and so enmeshed with
the current use of the expression "fundamental vested rights" that in
the interests of coherence and clarity, consideration of it has been deferred to a later section.
The "probable" of Drummey and the "mandatory" of McDonough
both referred only to what the court considered the requirements of the
44. Whitten v. California State Bd. of Optometry, 8 Cal. 2d 444, 65 P.2d 1296 (1937).
45. Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Ass'n, 11 Cal. 3d 28, 35-38, 520

P.2d 29, 33-36, 112 Cal. Rptr. 805, 809-11 (1974); Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 141,481 P.2d 242,
250, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 242 (1971); Dare v. Board of Medical Examiners, 21 Cal. 2d 790, 812, 136
P.2d 304, 316 (1943) (Traynor, J., concurring and dissenting).
46. 13 Cal. 2d 75, 87 P.2d 848 (1939).
47. Id at 84, 87 P.2d at 853.
48. 13 Cal. 2d 741, 752, 91 P.2d 1035, 1041-42 (1939).
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federal constitution. Laisne v. California State Board of Optometry,4 9
however, made the independent judgment test a requirement of the due
process clause of the state constitution.5 0 Laisne held that a trial de
novo was required to review administrative revocation of a license not
only because of the separation of powers clauses of the state constitution but also that
[a] further reason and one of equal strength is that if binding factfinding power is conferred upon purely administrative boards, and if
the courts in reviewing the administrative boards' actions do not exercise an independent judgment on the facts as well as on the law, the
due process provisions of both the federal and state Constitutions
will have been violated. 5 1
The court recognized that there was some confusion in the federal
cases, but held that this confusion
does not detract from the strength of the language of these cases
when applied to the question of the powers of state-wide administrative agencies as controlled by the provisions of the Constitution of
this state. . . such [administrative] action denies the aggrieved party
the due process of law guaranteed to him by the state and federal
Constitutions, unless such action by such body may be questioned in
a court of law. It should always be kept in mind that the evil of
administrative action which must be guarded against is not the factfinding power, but the conclusiveness of the factfinding power coupled with the order based on the findings made which would deprive
a person of a property right. . . . The federal cases. . . are. . . not
controlling on this court when the power of a state administrative
board is in question.52
Thus in 1942 the court anticipated a result that it again articulated
some thirty years later: the federal constitution provides only minimum requirements that may be extended to provide greater individual
protection under parallel provisions of the state constitution. 3
Laisne's requirement of a trial de novo was qualified in Dare v.
Boardof MedicalExaminers 4 by an explication of what sort of procedure the court had in mind, but the court repeated its position that
administrative action that might deprive a person "of a constitutional
right either of liberty or property" entitled him to a review by manda49. 19 Cal. 2d 831, 923 P.2d 457 (1942).
50. Now Article I, Section 7(a).
51. 19 Cal. 2d 845, 123 P.2d 465 (1942).
52. Id at 846-47, 123 P.2d at 466.
53. People v. Hannon, 19 Cal. 3d 588, 606, 564 P.2d 1203, 1214, 138 Cal. Rptr. 885, 896
(1977); Brennan, State Constitutionsandthe ProtectionofIndividualfRihts, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489
(1977); see Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 11 Cal. 3d 352, 366-67 n.21, 521 P.2d 441, 449-50 n.21,
113 Cal. Rptr. 449, 457-58 n.21 (1974); Pipkin v. Board of Supervisors, 82 Cal. App. 3d 652, 660,
147 Cal. Rptr. 502, 506-07 (1978).
54. 21 Cal. 2d 790, 136 P.2d 304 (1943).
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mus wherein "the court is not confined to the record before the board

but may exercise an independent judgment on all the competent evidence before it."" Dare did not, nor has any subsequent case, expressly impaired Laisne's reliance on the state due process clause. On
the contrary, the discussion in Bixby v. Pierno5" of the survival of the
independent judgment rule in several states after the virtual demise of

the federal basis for the rule shows, inferentially at least, that this aspect of Laisne is still alive.

7

Thus if 4nton raises an issue as to the

c.onstitutionality of new Section 1094.5(d), it is an issue only under the
state constitution. To determine whether such an issue is raised some

legislative background is helpful.
THE CHANGE IN DEFINITION OF "ADMINISTRATIVE"; SOME
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The procedural and substantive chaos caused by StandardOil, Drummey, McDonough and other cases5 8 was so severe that the legislature

submitted a constitutional amendment, said to have been drafted by
Dean McGovney,

9

that would have given the legislature the authority

to prescribe the scope of review "of decisions of administrative officers,
boards, commissions or agencies." 60 The amendment was vigorously
debated, before it was voted on Laisne was decided, and the amendment was defeated at the November 1942 election.6 ' Nevertheless, the
legal morass remained impenetrable, and the legislature remained determined to do what it could. It therefore asked the Judicial Council to
undertake a study "of review of decisions of administrative boards,

commissions and officers" and to report recommended legislation. 62 In
55. Id at 795, 136 P.2d at 307.
56. 4 Cal. 3d 130, 481 P.2d 242, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1971).
57. Id. at 138 n.4, 481 P.2d at 247 n.4, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 239 n.4. Modern Barber Colleges, Inc.
v. CalforniaEmployment Stabilization Comm'n, 31 Cal. 2d 720, 725, 192 P.2d 916, 919 (1948),
notes with approval Laisne's reliance on the state due process clause. But the concurring opinion
of Justice Burke in Bixby mentions only Drummey and Laisne's reliance on the federal due process clause. 4 Cal. 3d at 156, 158, 481 P.2d at 261-62, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 253-54 (Burke, J., concurring). The dissent in Dare similarly omits reference to the state due process clause. Dare v. Board
of Medical Examiners, 21 Cal. 2d 790, 812, 136 P.24 304, 316 (1943) (Traynor, J., concurring and
dissenting).
58. For definitive discussions of the history see the materials cited at note 31 supra.
59. Turrentine, The Laisne Case-A Strange Chapterin Our State Jurisprudence, 17 CAL.ST.
B.J. 165, 166 (1942) (an argument in favor of the amendment) [hereinafter cited as Turrentine].
60. S.C.A. No. 8, CAL. STATS. 1941, res. c. 142, at 3549. This was proposition number 16 on

the ballot.

CAL. STATS.

1943, at cxlii.

61. Laisne v. California State Bd. of Optometry, 19 Cal. 2d 831, 848, 123 P.2d 457, 467
(1942); Resolution of the Board of Governors of the State Bar, reprintedin Reasons Why The State
Barof Californiais Opposed to PropositionNo. 16, 17 CAL. ST. B.J. 257 (1942); Bianchi, The Case
,4gainst S. CA. Number 8, 17 CAL. ST. B.J. 172 (1942); Browne, Proposition16 Should be Defeated,
17 CAL. ST. B.J. 184 (1942); Turrentine, supra note 59.
62. CAL. STATS. 1943, res. c. 991, §2, at 2904. TENTH BIENNIAL REPORT, supranote 28, at 8,
describing this statute as "only one part of a general legislative interest in the field of administrative procedure."
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the context of Anton the points to note from these fragments of history
are that all of the cases leading to the confusion involved governmental
agencies, 63 and the legislature consistently used the word "administrative" to describe them. Thus when the court said in Anton that it could
find nothing in the "supporting legislative materials" to warrant the
"assumption" that Section 1094.5 related only to governmental agencies, it was, apparently, excluding this part of the history as irrelevant.
The Judicial Council responded to the legislature by submitting its
Tenth BiennialReport. In the absence of any legislative history as such,

it has been generally assumed that the legislature "'adopted the proposed legislation with the intent and meaning expressed by the council
in its report.' "6 The Judicial Council recommended the adoption of
Section 1094.5, which it titled as "[a]n act

. . .

relating to the judicial

review of administrative decisions," and described as "the procedure
by which judicial review can be had by the writ of mandate after a
formal adjudicatory decision by any administrative agency."65 But for
some additions to Section 1094.5(f), which are immaterial here, the act
was adopted as proposed by the Council including the restrictive title.66
Thus even if the statute had referred to private bodies, it would have
67
been limited by the title to the review of "administrative decisions.
But the language of the statute was consistent with the title and spoke

only to the review of an "administrative order or decision" made after
a hearing by an "inferi6r tribunal, corporation, board or officer."
In the present context the word "administrative" has heretofore been

used only to apply to public bodies, for example, "[a]n administrative
agency is a governmental authority ... 68 Conversely, a nongovernmental commission "is not an administrative agency."' 69 But despite
63. Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 19 Cal. 3d 802, 815-16, 567 P.2d 1162, 1169,
140 Cal. Rptr. 442, 449 (1977).
64. Id at 817, 567 P.2d at 1170, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 450.
65. TENTH BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 28 at 45.
66. CAL. STATS. 1945, c. 868, §1, at 1636 (enacting CAL. CIV. PROC.CODE §1094.5).
67. CAL. CONST. art. IV, §9 (formerly §24); Estate of Mellone, 141 Cal. 331, 333-34, 74 P.
991, 992 (1903); Balzano v. Traeger, 93 Cal. App. 640, 648, 270 P. 249, 252 (1928); see Powers
Farms v. Consolidated Irrigation Dist., 19 Cal. 2d 123, 130, 119 P.2d 717, 722 (1941); Powers v.
Floersheim, 256 Cal. App. 2d 223, 231-32, 63 Cal. Rptr. 913, 918 (1967).
68. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND GOVERNMENT 6 (2d ed. 1975); 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §1.01 (1958) (supp. 1970); Id 1970 supp. at 2; 1 AM. JUR. 2d 4dministrative Law §3 (1962); BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 34 (3d ed. 1969); BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 66 (4th ed. 1968). "[A]dministrative law: law dealing with the establishment, duties,
and powers of and available remedies against authorized agencies in the executive branch of government." MERRIAM-WEBSTER THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 28 (3d ed. 1967). The
relation of "administrative law" to public functions seems to be coeval with the first common use
of the expression in this country. "[A]dministrative law is that part of the law which governs the
relations of the executive and administrative authorities of the government. It is therefore a part
of the public law .. " I F. GOODNOW, COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 7 (1893).
69. Natural Milk Producers Ass'n v. City and County of San Francisco, 20 Cal. 2d 101, 115,
124 P.2d 25, 33 (1942), vacated as moot, 317 U.S. 423 (1943).
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the common use of language, the history that lead to the Council's
study, and the court's recognition that the Council "admitted" its study
was "concem[ed] . . . exclusively with the review of governmental
agency decisions," 7 the court in Anton held of the words "administrative order or decision," in Section 1094.5(a): "Clearly this language is
not limited, on its face at least, to governmental as opposed to nongovernmental agencies."'"
The court reached this result by noting the parallelism between Section 1094.5(a), which refers to "any inferior tribunal, corporation,
board or officer," and Section 1085, so-called "traditional mandate,"
which refers to "'any inferior tribunal, corporation, board orperson,'"
and stating:
We are not persuaded that the Legislature, in substituting the word
'officer' for the word 'person' in its 1949 [sic] enactment of Section
1094.5, thereby intended to indicate that the new procedure was
designed to be limited in its application to the decisions of governmental bodies.72
It was not persuaded, because otherwise the two sections are "substantially identical. '7 3 Indeed, the two sections are substantially identical,
except for the difference. "It is a settled rule of statutory construction
that where different language is used in the same connection in different parts of a statute, it is presumed the legislature intended a different
meaning and effect.74 The court avoided "the settled rule" by ignoring
it. And if the California Supreme Court wishes to say that "officer"
and "person" mean the same thing, who can say that it is wrong? "We
are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final."75
The court also adverted to the statement in the Council's report:
Without affecting the historic uses of the writ it is suggested that, by
the addition of a new section to the statute [the Code of Civil Procedure], the Legislature could prescribe the details of procedure where
the writ is used for reviewing the adjudicatory decisions of administrative bodies.7 6
The suggestion, however, was not that of the Council, it was that of
70. Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 19 Cal. 3d 802, 818, 567 P.2d 1162, 1170, 140

Cal. Rptr. 442, 450 (1977).
71. Id at 816, 567 P.2d at 1169, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 449.
72. Id at 816 n.13, 567 P.2d at 1169 n.13, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 449 n.13.
73. Id at 817, 567 P.2d at 1170, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 450
74. People v. Campbell, 110 Cal. App. Supp. 783, 786, 291 P.2d 161, 162 (1930); 45 CAL. JUR.
2d Statutes §143, at 650 n.16 (1958). See also Estate of Dennery, 52 Cal. App. 3d 393, 397-98, 124
Cal. Rptr. 910, 912 (1975); In re Karpf, 10 Cal. App. 3d 355, 365, 88 Cal. Rptr. 895, 900 (1970).
75. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
76. Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 19 Cal. 3d 802, 818, 567 P.2d 1162, 1170, 140
Cal. Rptr. 442, 450 (1977) (emphasis in original); TENTH BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 28 at 27.
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Justice Schauer concurring in Sper v. Urban.7 7 The reason why the
court emphasized the reference to the "historic uses of the writ" is not
apparent. The historic use of Section 1085 to review the action of private bodies and quasi-legislative action had persisted unchanged after
the passage of Section 1094.5.78 Anton itself changed the historic use of
the writ by enlarging the scope of review of the quasi-judicial action of
private bodies.7 9 One can speculate that the emphasis may have been
an oblique reference to the court's power to expand the uses of mandate "to provide a remedy where no other remedy existed." 80
The court in Anton omitted the Council's repeated statements that its
proposal was "limited to the field of administrative adjudication,"81
and "cases involving administrative adjudication." 2 Instead it quoted
the Council's statement: "'The theories underlying the Council's proposals in this limited field are susceptible, of course, of adaptation to
other kinds of administrative action .

."83 The quotation is out of
'

context, because by "limited field" the Council was referring to the fact
that its study of administrative procedure had been limited to professional and occupational licensing and did not include "such diverse
functions as . . . taxation, workmen's compensation, public utilities

regulation
and the payment of unemployment or social security benefits."'8 4 The Council carefully distinguished between its study of "administrative procedure" and its study of "review of administrative
action."8 " In context the "adaptation" to which the Council referred
was not to judicial review but to the fields of administrative procedure
it had not covered.
But from this medley of neglect of history, disregard of the ordinary
meaning of words, partial quotation, quotation out of context, and ignoring conventional rules of construction, the court in Anton drew its
conclusion that Section 1094.5 applied to private hospitals because it
would be "incongruous" to conclude otherwise. In effect what the
court did was rewrite the definition of "administrative" to characterize
the form of action taken rather than to characterize the nature of the
actor. Thus it said that a private hospital's "adjudicatory decisions are
77. 22 Cal. 2d 138, 151, 137 P.2d 425, 431 (1943).
78. Cason v. Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 37 Cal. 2d 134, 147,231 P.2d 6, 13 (1951); Lewin v.
St. Joseph Hospital of Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d 368, 383, 146 Cal. Rptr. 892, 900-01 (1978) (collecting authorities on review of quasi-legislative action).
79. See text accompanying notes 12-19 supra.
80. Drummey v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors, 13 Cal. 2d 75, 82, 87 P.2d 848, 852 (1939).
81. TENTH BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 28 at 26.
82. Id at 27.
83. Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 19 Cal. 3d 802, 818, 567 P.2d 1162, 1170, 140
Cal. Rptr. 442, 450 (1977); TENTH BIENNAL REPORT, supra note 28 at 10.
84. TENTH BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 28 at 10.
85. Id at 12, 26.
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subject to review under the same rules which are applicable to all decisions by administrative agencies lacking judicial powers," 86 e., a hospital is an administrative agency because it acts administratively
whether it be public or private,8 7 a position it forthrightly reiterated
since Anton:
We have said that the right to practice a lawful trade or profession is
sufficiently 'fundamental' to require substantial protection against arbitrary administrative
interference, either by government. . . or by a
88
private entity.
"Administrative interference by a private entity" is a neologism, but
there is no doubt as to its meaning-the court intended to treat a private group that had powers like those of a public agency as if it were a
public agency.
There are various jocular ways to describe the judicial technique
used in Anton. The most familiar is that biological phenomenon, the
speaking egg whose words have turned into a law review chestnut so
overworked that they are here allowed to repose in the margin. 9 Less
familiar is Professor Corwin's observation:
Undoubtedly the Court has the right to make history, as it has often
done in the past; but it has no right to remake it.90
But what seems most appropriate to Anton is Edmund Wilson's criticism of the scholarship of one interpreter of the Dead Sea Scrolls:
[B]y using such methods I should have little 9difficulty in proving that
the Pentateuch was written by Ben Gurion. 1
THE APPLICABLE SCOPE OF REVIEW

Section 1094.5 recognizes two different scopes of review, the "independent judgment rule" and the "substantial evidence rule." Thus
when Anton held that Section 1094.5 was applicable to the action of a
private group, the court had to decide which rule was applicable. This
decision, in turn, presents a further question: whether the choice is to
86. 19 Cal. 3d at 822, 567 P.2d at 1173, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 453.
87. Id at 825, 567 P.2d at 1175, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 455 (describes the private hospital as "the
administrative body"). See text accompanying note 108 infra.
88. Ezekial v. Winkley, 20 Cal. 3d 267, 272, 572 P.2d 32, 35, 142 Cal. Rptr. 418, 421 (1977).
See also California Dental Ass'n v. American Dental Ass'n, 23 Cal. 3d 346, 357, 590 P.2d 401,
407, 152 Cal. Rptr. 546, 552 (1979).
89. For precedent for the verbal agility in Dr. Anton's case consult no conventional law
book. Look rather to Through the Looking Glass..
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, "it means what
I choose it to mean-neither more nor less." "The question is," said Alice, "whether you
can make words mean so many different things." "The question is," said Humpty
Dumpty, "which is to be master-that's all."
L. CARROLL, THE ANNOTATED ALICE 269 (M. Gardner ed. 1960).
90. Corwin, he Supreme Court as NationalSchool Board, 14 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 3, 20
(1949) (emphasis in original).
91. E. WILSON,ISRAEL AND THE DEAD SEA SCROLLS 276 (1978) (Foreword by L. Edel).
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be made by the courts or by the legislature. Some language in Bixby
may suggest that the choice is legislative because in an unguarded moment the court said that Section 1094.5 "empowers this court to establish standards" for determining which cases call for which review and
that the legislature "created" the categories of review.92 But elsewhere
in Bixby it more correctly described Section 1094.5 as a "codification of
the then [1944] current approach to the judicial review of administrative decisions by writ of mandamus."93 The most creation and codiication have in common is the initial letter. The Judicial Council described its proposal as a codification and recognized that it could not be
creative because of the constitutional restrictions imposed by the
cases.9 4 The court has "empowered" itself; the legislature has only the
power to describe but not to determine the scope of judicial review,
unless the plurality opinion in Tex-Cal can be taken at face value. 95
This was clearly and succinctly set forth as a syllogism in Justice Traynor's dissent in Southern CaliforniaJockey Club:

Judicial functions cannot constitutionally be delegated to state-wide
administrative agencies. The function of making final findings of
fact is judicial, and such finality can be accorded only to the findings
of fact of a court.... Accordingly, the findings of fact of an admin-

istrative agency must be reviewed by a court that must exercise its
independent judgment on the facts .. .and determine therefrom

whether those findings are supported by the weight of the evidence
• . .and not merely by substantialevidence. Presumably, any more

limited review would confer judicial functions upon the administra-

92. Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 140, 481 P.2d 242, 249, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 241 (1971).
93. Id at 137-38, 481 P.2d at 247, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 239. Other cases also describe Section
1094.5 as a codification, see, e.g., Merrill v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 71 Cal. 2d 907, 914
n.ll, 458 P. 2d 33,37 n.1l, 80 CaL Rptr. 89,93 n.11 (1969); Temescal Water Co. v. Department of
Pub. Works, 44 Cal. 2d 90, 105, 280 P.2d 1, 10 (1955).
94. These proposals do not depart from the procedural pattern laid down by recent court
decisions, and the proposed statute specifies the details of procedure for judicial review
by the writ of mandate. The proposals do not purport to be a complete solution to all the
problems of judicial review. Indeed, the steps which have been recommended by some,
as for example, the use of a simple statutory proceeding in place of the extraordinary
writs, do not seem feasible in view of the limited power which the Legislature has to act
in this field.

TENTH BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 28 at 26-27, 144. Section 1094.5 is largely a codification of

Dare, see text accompanying notes 54-57 supra, and "in view of the dubious but nonetheless
controlling principles of constitutional law announced in the StandardOil and Drummey cases,
there was probably little more that either the Council could recommend or the Legislature could
enact constitutionally." Netterville, JudicialReview: The "Independent Judgment" Anomaly, 44
CALI. L. Rav. 262, 268 (1956); TENTH BIENNI.L REPORT, supra note 28 at 141 n.60. See also
Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners, 32 Cal. 2d 301, 315, 196 P.2d 20, 29 (1948) (Traynor, J.,
dissenting). The limitation on legislative authority has been expressed in at least two dissenting
opinions: Strumsky v. San Diego Counyp Employees RetirementAss'n, 11 Cal. 3d 28, 53, 520 P.2d
29, 47, 112 Cal. Rptr. 805, 822, (1974) (Burke, J., dissenting) and Southern Cal Jockey Club v.
CaliforniaHorse RacingBd, 36 Cal. 2d 167, 183-84, 223 P.2d 1, 11 (1950) (Traynor, J.,
dissenting).
95. Tex-Cal Land Management, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 24 Cal. 3d 335,
346, 595 P.2d 579, 585, 156 Cal. Rptr. 1, 7 (1979).
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tive agency in violation of the constitutional prohibition thereof.9 6

The correctness of Justice Traynor's assumption was proven almost a
quarter of a century later by Strumsky. The Council had drafted Sec-

tion 1094.5 on the theory that local boards could be delegees of judicial
functions and would be subject to the substantial evidence scope of re-

view whether the writ was called certiorari or mandamus.97 In Strumsky, in 1974, the court found that the revision of the judiciary article of

the California Constitution, Article VI, Section 1, in 1950 had withdrawn the legislature's power to delegate judicial functions to local
boards. Therefore, the actions of such boards, which had heretofore

evidence review, became subject to
been subjected to the substantial 98
the independent judgment review.

But the independent judgment review applies only if there has been a
delegation of "judicial" power. If there has been a delegation only of

"administrative" power, the substantial evidence test applies. This distinction is based on McDonough v. Goodcel,9 9 which held "that where
the legislature has by statute clothed an administrative officer with the

power to ascertain the facts with reference to the fitness of an applicant" and the evidence before the officer was conflicting and would
have supported a decision either way, it could not be concluded that
the officer had abused his discretion." °° "With this state of the record
our inquiry on this phase of the case is at an end."' 0 1 Thus arose the

California distinction between the scope of review in the application
cases and the revocation cases.10 2 In the current phraseology this dis-

tinction is phrased in terms of substantially affecting a "fundamental
vested right." If the administrative decision affects a "fundamental

vested right," such as the right to keep a license, the power to make
final findings of fact must remain in the courts; but if the administrative

decision affects only a "nonfundamental and not vested" right, such as
final findings of fact may
the right to seek a license, the power to make
03
be delegated to an administrative agency.1

96. 36 Cal. 2d at 181-82, 223 P.2d at 10 (Traynor, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
97. TENTH BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 28 at 26, 138 n.32, 140 nn.48 & 50.
98. Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Ass'n, 11 Cal. 3d 28, 32, 39, 520
P.2d 29, 31, 36, 112 Cal. Rptr. 805, 807, 812 (1974).
99. 13 Cal. 2d 741, 91 P.2d 1035 (1939). See notes 185-200 and accompanying text infra.
100. 13 Cal. 2d at 748, 91 P.2d at 1040.
101. Id at 749, 91 P.2d at 1040.
102. This distinction is reviewed in Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 139, 146,481 P.2d 242,248,
253, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 240, 245 (1971).
103. Id at 143-44, 481 P.2d at 351-52, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 243-44; Strumsky v. San Diego County
Employees Retirement Ass'n, 11 Cal. 3d 28, 32,44-45, 520 P.2d 29, 31, 40, 112 Cal.Rptr. 805, 807,
816, (1974). "The distinctions [between 'an administrative act rather than a judicial act'] are difficult to follow because in both cases [Drummey and MeDonough] the practical results were identical." Beverly Hills Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Superior Court, 259 Cal. App. 2d 306, 315, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 183, 187 (1968).
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So, having held that Section 1094.5 was applicable to the private hospital, the court in Anton had to determine whether staff membership
was a "fundamental vested right." Its "fundamental" character was
virtually conceded." ° But the hospital argued that the doctor's staff
privileges could not be considered "vested," because Business and Professions Code Section 2392.5 requires staff appointments to be made on
an annual or biennial basis. The court held, however, that although the
appointment was "formally limited in duration by force of law, [it nevertheless] gives rise to rights and obligations" that require it to be renewed unless good cause for denial of reappointment is shown in a
"proceeding consistent with minimal due process requirements."1 05 Although not cited, this holding is consistent with the occupational licensing cases holding that a refusal to renew an annual license is
tantamount to a revocation and implying that renewal is a right that
cannot be denied without the procedures required for revocation. 106
Thus the court enabled itself to expand the portentous statement in
Bixby that it has undertaken to protect "vested, fundamental rights
. . .particularly the right to practice one's trade or profession, from
untoward intrusions by the massive apparatus of government,"' 1 7 and
to extend it to what the court seems to believe are equally sinister intrusions by private groups.
On the basis of the foregoing, we think it manifest that the right affected by the decision here in question is both fundamental and
vested within the meaning of Bixby and Srumsky. It therefore appears that the trial court was in error when it refused to exercise its
independent judgment on the evidence presented before the administrative body [the private hospital] in order to determine whether the
findings offered in support
of the decision were supported by the
08
weight of the evidence.'
THE PRIVATE HOSPITALS' REACTION TO

ANTON

By Senate Bill 1472 (1978) the California Hospital Association attacked both aspects of Anion, ie., the holding that medical staff membership is a "fundamental vested right," and the holding that Section
104. Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 19 Cal. 3d 802, 823, 567 P.2d 1162, 1173, 140

Cal. Rptr. 442, 453 (1977).
105. Id at 824-25, 567 P.2d at 1174-75, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 454-55.
106. Hall v. Scudder, 74 Cal. App. 2d 433, 436, 168 P.2d 990, 992 (1946); see Citrus Belt Say.
& Loan Ass'n v. California Franchise Tax Bd., 218 Cal. App. 2d 584, 591, 32 Cal. Rptr. 579, 583
(1963); cf Mass v. Board of Educ., 61 Cal. 2d 612, 619, 394 P.2d 579, 584, 39 Cal. Rptr. 739, 744
(1964) (renewal of teaching credential).
107. Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 143, 481 P.2d 242, 251, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 243 (1971).
108. Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 19 Cal. 3d 802, 825, 567 P.2d 1162, 1175, 140
Cal. Rptr 442, 455 (1977); California Dental Ass'n v. American Dental Ass'n, 23 Cal 3d 346, 357,
590 P.2d 401, 407, 152 Cal Rptr. 546, 552 (1979).
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1094.5 is applicable to private groups. As introduced, the bill would
have amended Business and Professions Code Section 2392.5 to pro-

vide that staff membership was not a "vested" right'0 9 as well as language giving all "private tribunals, corporations, boards, or officers"
the benefit of the substantial evidence rule."10 Assembly amendments

deleted the proposed change in Section 2392.5 and limited the substantial evidence rule to private hospitals. The bill was passed in its present

form, new Section 1094.5(d)."' The significance of the elimination of
the proposed amendment to Section 2392.5 will be referred to hereaf12
ter.

The California Hospital Association supported the constitutionality
of new Section 1094.5(d) on the ground that it concerns only the management of the affairs of private institutions to which the constitutional
guarantees of due process have no application." 3 The basis of the argument is that the due process clause of the California Constitution

applies only to state, not private, action."l 4 This argument assumes that
a private hospital is not a "state instrumentality," for if it were "we may
arrive at judicial recognition that such institutions and enterprises
should be considered agents of the state, so that those who deal with
them will receive the protection not only of decisional law but of constitutional due process.""1 5 Heretofore it has not been necessary for the
court to characterize a private hospital as a state agency, because the
cases have arisen in a context of interpretation of private regulations
into which the court has read requirements of "fair procedure" applied
as a matter of common law doctrine rather than constitutional neces109. The bill would have added the following to California Business and Professions Code
Section 2392.5: "[C]linical privileges. . . shall remain vested only during the annual or biennial
period for which they were granted." SB 1472, 1977-78 Regular Session, as introduced,February
2, 1978. The holder of a restricted license that grants "no property right" is entitled only to the
substantial evidence test. Foster v. McConnell, 162 Cal. App. 2d 701, 329 P.2d 32 (1958).
110. SB 1472, 1977-78 Regular Session, as introduced,February 2, 1978, §2 at 3-4.
111. CAL. STATS. 1978, c. 1348, §1, at - (enacting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §1094.5(d)).
112. See text accompanying note 160 infra.
113. Letter from Joseph A. Saunders to Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Sept. 26, 1978 (copy
on file at the PacficLaw Journal).
114. Garfinkle v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 268, 281, 578 P.2d 925, 933, 146 Cal. Rptr. 208,
217 (1978). The difference between the active language of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law," and that of the fifth amendment and California Constitution Article
I, Section 7(a), which state in the passive voice that a person shall not "be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law," has not in the past made a difference in meaning. Kruger
v. Wells Fargo Bank, 11 Cal. 3d 352, 366, 521 P.2d 441, 450, 113 Cal. Rptr. 449, 458 (1974).
Garfinkle also finds no significance in the fact that the State due process clause is no longer linked,
as it was originally, to the rights of those accused of crime. Cf R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY 193-200 (1977) (arguing historically that "due process" meant only that a criminal
defendant should be proceeded against only by the law of the land and that the term had no
substantive connotations).
115. Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 11 Cal. 3d 352, 365, 521 P.2d 441, 449, 113 Cal. Rptr. 449,
457 (1974).
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If all that were involved were common law doctrines affecting
private groups dealing with nonconstitutionally protected rights, it
would seem the legislature could alter the doctrines, 1 7 and no exception could be taken to the California Hospital Association's argument.
In fact, however, the point is very slippery.
DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO A PRIVATE GROUP AS "STATE
ACTION"

In Ascherman v. Saint FrancisMemorial Hospital"' the court cited

with approval cases from other jurisdictions holding that receipt of federal funds was enough to make a private hospital a state agent for purposes of subjecting it to the constitutional requirements. 19 Although
these cases have not been universally accepted under the federal constitution, 120 there is no reason why the California courts could not apply
them under the state constitution. That they intend to do so may be
inferred from some of the language in Anton that elides the meticulous
distinction between common law and constitutional requirements made
in Pinskcer 11,121 and the copious citation of Ascherman describing it
with approval as:
[c]oncluding that there should be no essential difference between
public and private hospitals with respect to the scope of protections
available at the administrative level to a physician seeking to become
or remain a member of the medical staff... .
Are such statements merely the loose use of language to describe an
existing situation? Or are they portents of things to come? A recent
expression repeats rather than resolves the issue:
We place the word 'private' in quotes because, as respects the exclusion or expulsion of physicians from staff membership and the
procedures requisite thereto, there
is little difference legally between
23
public and private hospitals.'
In CaiforniaDentalAssociationv. American DentalAssociation,124 in
a dictum because the case did not involve "application of common law
principles of fair procedure," the court said "the holding in Anton was
116. Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soe'y of Orthodontists, 12 Cal. 3d 541, 550 n.7, 526 P.2d 253, 259,
n.7, 116 Cal. Rptr. 245, 251 n.7 (1974) (Pinsker II).
117. Goldberg, Horseshoers,Doctors and Judges and the Law on Medical Competence, 9 PAc.
L.J. 107, 141-42 (1978).
118. 45 Cal. App. 3d 507, 119 Cal. Rptr. 507 (1975).

119. Id at 512-13, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 510.
120. Hodge v. Paoli Memorial Hosp., 576 F.2d 563 (3d Cir. 1978).
121. See text accompanying note 163 infra.
122. Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 19 Cal. 3d 802, 815 n.12, 567 P.2d 1162, 1169
n.12, 140 Cal. Rptr. 442, 448 n.12 (1977).
123. Lewin v. St. Joseph Hosp. of Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d 368, 376 n.3, 146 Cal. Rptr. 892 n.3
(1978).
124. 23 Cal. 3d 346, 590 P.2d 401, 152 Cal. Rptr. 546. (1979).
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based on our application of common law principles of fair procedure."I25 This does not necessarily mean that Anton was not also based
on constitutional grounds as the language in Anton seems to indicate.
But assuming that the characterization of Anton was intended to exclude the constitutional grounds, it raises the question whether it makes
any difference whether the basis is common law or constitution. In
short, are there common law principles of fair procedure that the legislature cannot change? 2 6
The question is not whether Section 1094.5 was intended to apply to
private groups, for clearly it was not; nor is it whether a private hospital
is an "administrative" agency, for clearly it is not; it is whether the state
by either common law or statute can delegate authority to a private
hospital to make a final determination of facts resulting in barring a
physician from effectively practicing his profession or whether such a
final determination can be made in this state only by a court.' 27 The
mere fact that128Section 1094.5(d) was enacted, in a sense, constitutes
"state action."
By this action the state delegated to private hospitals
the authority to make determinations of fact subject only to substantial
125. Id at 357, 590 P.2d at 407, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 553.
126. Omitted is an extensive discussion of the possibility that regardless of constitutional limitations there may be rights of such a fundamental character that they cannot be changed because
of the limitations inherent in the very concept of "legislative" power. Such seems to be the holding of Loan Association v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655 (1874).
It must be conceded that there are such rights in every free government beyond the
control of the State. . . . There are limitations on such power which grow out of the
essential nature of all free governments. Implied reservations of individual rights, without which the social compact could not exist, and which are respected by all governments
entitled to the name.
Id at 662-63. There was a dissent arguing that reliance by the Court on the "vague ground...
[of] a general latent spirit supposed to pervade or underlie the constitution ... would convert the
government into a judicial despotism." Id at 669 (Clifford, J., dissenting). See generally E.
CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 141 (1 1th ed. 1965); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §8-1, at 427-31 (1978). The "common law principles of fair procedure" required of private groups dealing with "fundamental vested rights" could perhaps be put
in this "higher law" or "natural law" or "extra constitutional" category as the process of assimilation of private to public agencies continues. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27
STAN. L. Rav. 703, 715-17 (1975) (suggests these are constitutional categories); R. BERGER, GovERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 257 n.38 (1977).
127. If these [public function] decisions are recast as raising questions of whether government actors can constitutionally decide to leave certain decisions to private actors, analysis of the cases becomes much more straightforward.
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §18-5, at 1163-64 (1978). "The general proposition
that common law is state action is hardly controversial." Id §18-6, at 1168.
[Tihe question whether procedural due process is accorded by the system of rules
through which a state allocates powers and duties in disputes between [doctors and private hospitals]. . . focuses attention at once on an aspect of state law; that aspect either
is or is not constitutional; that it is 'state action' could hardly be clearer. And that more
power is left to the [private hospital] ... than in schemes in which government plays a
more active role. . . adds to, rather than subtracts from, the procedural infirmity of the
state's law.
Id §18-6 at 1171.
128. See Garfinkle v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 268, 273-74, 578 P.2d 925, 928, 146 Cal. Rptr.
208, 211-12 (1978); Connolly Development, Inc. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 803, 815, 553 P.2d
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evidence review, or, conversely, deprived the courts of authority to re-

weigh the evidence in decisions depriving doctors of a property right,
i e., a substantial, vested and fundamental right in the current phraseology. It is "manifest" that a doctor's hospital privileges are in either or
both of these categories, and the hospital "has not contended otherwise."' 2 9 The state cannot delegate to a private person the absolute

discretion to deprive another private person of a substantial right; it
must afford the person deprived of the right the protections of due
0

process. 13
STATE DUE PROCESS AND INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT REVIEW

The special problem in California is whether due process under the

state constitution requires opportunity to have the evidence reweighed
by a court.' 3 ' Bixby, with its approving reiteration of Drummey, says
that before a person may be deprived of a fundamental right by an
administrative (governmental) agency, he must be given an opportu32
nity to obtain an independent judgment of the court on the facts.
This is because (with constitutional agency exceptions not material
here) the exercise of the power to make final determinations of fact

from conflicting evidence in cases involving "fundamental vested
function, and a judicial function can be exercised
rights" is a judicial
133

only by a court.
As already explained in its historical context, this rule is based only
in part on the judiciary article and separation of powers provisions of
the state constitution; it is also based on the California court's conception of due process. Drummey invoked the federal constitution only,
but LaIsne relied on the state constitution.' 34 The state due process

aspect of Laisne was reinforced by Bixby, because Laisne is cited in
637, 645, 132 Cal. Rptr. 477, 485 (1976); Blye v. Globe-Wernicke Realty Co., 33 N.Y.2d 15, 20,
300 N.E.2d 710, 714 (1973).
129. Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp. 19 Cal. 3d 802, 823, 567 P.2d 1162, 1173-74, 140
Cal. Rptr. 442, 453-54 (1977).
130. Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 11 Cal. 3d 146, 153, 520 P.2d 961, 965, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 145, 153 (1974); Ascherman v. San Francisco Medical Soe'y, 39 Cal. App. 3d 623, 647, 114
Cal. Rptr. 681, 696 (1974); Blye v. Globe-Wernicke Realty Co., 33 N.Y.2d 15, 20-21, 300 N.E.2d
710, 714 (1973). But see Scott, ConstitutionalRegulation of ProvisionalCreditorRemedies: The
Cost ofProcedural Due Process, 61 VA.L. REv. 807, 807 n.3 (1975).
Bill, see note 2 supra, concludes that it
131. The Legislative Counsel's Report on Enrolled
the question beyond citing 4nton.
does, but the Report does not analyze
132. Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 143-45, 481 P.2d 242, 251-53, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 243.45
(1971).
133. "It is the essence of judicial action that finality is given to findings based on conflicting
evidence." Drummey v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors, 13 Cal. 2d 75, 84, 87 P.2d 848, 853 (1939).
134. Laisne v. California State Bd. of Optometery, 19 Cal. 2d 831, 845, 123 P.2d 457, 465
(1942). See text accompanying note 47 supra.
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Bixby as a proper application of Drummey.135 If the delegation of
"conclusive" factfinding authority to a public agency violates state due
process, it would seem to follow a fortiori that such delegation to a
private group would also violate state due process. Delegation by a
scheme where the private party plays a more powerful and the state
than
government a less active role, in Tribe's language, "adds to, 'rather
36
subtracts from, the procedural infirmity of the state's law."'
Nevertheless, despite the constitutional implications of Bixby,
Laisne, and Drummey, the most recent judicial statement, that of the
plurality in Tex-Cal LandManagement, Inc. v. AgriculturalLabor Relations Board,'3 7 is that the legislature has authority to determine the
standard courts must use in reviewing the factual determinations of
statewide agencies, provided38 that procedural safeguards are provided
at the administrative level.
Tex-Cal challenged California Labor Code Section 1160.8 providing
that in reviewing decisions of the Agricultural Labor Relations Board
(ALRB), the body responsible for enforcement of the Agricultural Labor Relations Act (ALRA), 139 the court is bound by the ALRB's factual
determinations that are supported by substantial evidence. 40 The
ALRB had found on the basis of substantial evidence that Tex-Cal had
committed various unfair labor practices and had ordered Tex-Cal to
refrain from such practices, required reinstatement and reimbursement
of certain employees who had been illegally laid off, and required notices in both Spanish and English to be mailed, posted, distributed, and
read telling employees of their rights under the ALRA. 14 1 Tex-Cal
challenged only the mailing and reading requirements, 142 and contended that it was entitled to the independent judgment of a superior
court on the evidence since the ALRB was not a constitutional agency
to which judicial powers could be delegated. The Court of Appeal,
however, held that the ALRB was an agency to which judicial power
could be granted under Article XIV, Section 1 of the California consti135. Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 138-40, 481 P.2d 242, 247-48, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 239-40

(1971). See text accompanying note 51 supra.
136. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §18-6, at 1171 (1978).
137. 24 Cal. 3d 335, 595 P.2d 579, 156 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1979).

138. Id. at 346, 595 P.2d at 585, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
139. See generally CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1140-1166.3.
140. Section 1160.8 provides in relevant part: "The findings of the board with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall... be
conclusive."
141. 24 Cal. 3d at 354, 595 P.2d at 590, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
142. 24 Cal. 3d at 355, 595 P.2d at 590-91, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 12-13. The facts and Tex-Cal's
contentions were stated more clearly by the court of appeal, Tex-Cal Land Management, Inc. v.
Agricultural Labor Relations Bd, 144 Cal. Rptr. 149, 162 (1978), than by the plurality of the

supreme court.
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tution. 4 3 The supreme court ignored the opinion of the Court of Appeal, although that opinion fit neatly into the conventional pattern of
California administrative law, and dismissing the authorities cited by
Tex-Cal without expressly overruling them, the plurality, without mentioning Article XIV, Section 1, said:
We therefore hold that the Legislature may accord finality to the
findings of a statewide agency that are supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole and are made under safeguards equivalent to those provided by the ALRA for unfair labor
practice proceedings, whether or not the California 'Constitution
pro1
vides for that agency's exercising "judicial power.
Here, as in Bixby, the plurality appears to attempt to foist the responsibility for the dual standard in Section 1094.5 on the legislature
rather than acknowledge that it is a description of what the court itself
created.145 They then go on to say that a statute providing for substantial evidence review might pass "constitutional muster" if it were accompanied by a guarantee of "administrative due process," 1 4 6 thereby
implying that the reason for the independent judgment rule was lack of
due process before the administrative agency but disparaging the fact
that, regardless of the process before the agency, the state due process
clause has been held to entitle a person deprived of what is now called
a "fundamental vested right" to the independent judgment of a court
on the evidence. 4 7
The plurality rest their "holding" on two grounds. Since the petitioner had attacked only the notice requirements of the ALRB's order,
and those only in part, it would appear arguable that no "vested fundamental right" was involved, and, therefore, that the substantial evidence standard applied. The plurality foreclosed this, because it
"would cause the standard for reviewing an unfair labor practice order
to vary" from case to case, and such variance would be "a prolific
source of litigious delay that the Legislature indisputably sought to
avoid."' 14 Thus the plurality would have obliterated the distinctions
between vested and nonvested and fundamental and nonfundamental
rights in the context of judicial review of administrative action. One
can agree with this conclusion without agreeing with the method by
143. "The legislature may provide for minimum wages and for the general welfare of employees and for those purposes may confer on a commission legislative, executive, and judicial powers." The history of Article XV, Section 1 is related in Tex-Cal Land Management, Inc. v.
AgriculturalLaborRelations Bd, 144 Cal. Rptr. 149, 152, 156 (1978). See note 24 supraon constitutional agencies.
144. 24 Cal. 3d at 346, 595 P.2d at 585, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
145. See id.
146. rd. at 344, 595 P.2d at 584, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
147. See id. at 343-44, 595 P.2d at 583-84, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 5-6. See notes 92 to 103 and
accompanying text supra.
148. Id. at 346, 595 P.2d at 585, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
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which it was reached. Certainly a doctrine which has become, rightly
or wrongly, so embedded in California constitutional law deserves a
more decent extinction than suffocation by the legislature's desire to
avoid delays of litigation in a particular area.
The constitutional limitations on legislative authority to delegate
finality of factfnding power to administrative agencies expressed in the
cases since 1936 were dismissed as dicta, because none of them involved a statute containing "a deliberate choice of a legislative standard." 14 9 Of course none of them involved a choice of legislative
standard. Before Standard Oil a choice was unnecessary because the
general law provided it, and after StandardOil it was only exceptionally permissible. Between 1936 and Tex-Cal in 1979 the Legislature
had no reason to think that it had authority to make a choice, 5 ' except
in cases like Tex-Cal itself where there was a particular grant of constitutional authority as pointed out by the Court of Appeal.15 1
As in Anton, the opinion appears to be one in which history is dissembled to achieve a foregone conclusion. A question that remains unanswered is why the plurality went through this exercise when a simple
answer conformable to the precedents was so readily available and
would have yielded the same result. One can speculate that there are
still too few justices willing to accept the position of Justice Burke in
Bixby and Strumsky and overrule Standard Oil and its progeny outright. Further one can speculate that there are now too few justices
willing to adopt or continue the historical dichotomy between constitutional and statutory agencies. But since the result in Tex-Cal would be
the same under either of the two approaches, there were enough justices to agree on the conclusion. Thus whether Tex-Cal will have any
bearing outside the constitutional area of "the general welfare of employees" remains to be seen. And since Tex-Cal contains its own caveat warning that not even the plurality have considered the
"standards applicable to local or private agencies,"15 the balance of
this paper proceeds on the assumption that it will not be usable as a
precedent of general application. If this assumption is wrong, then
Tex-Cal can be invoked in support of the constitutionality of Section
1094.5(d), and the arguments of unconstitutionality derived from the
cases since StandardOil can be disregarded.
149. Id. at 345, 595 P.2d at 585, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
150. TENTH BIENNrIL REPORT, supra note 28 at 26-27 and 133. See notes 92 to 98 and accompanying text supra.
151. 144 Cal. Rptr. at 152. See note 24 supra on constitutional agencies.
152. Our holding does not, of course, affect review of administrative findings where the
Legislature has left the choice of review standard to the courts [e.g. as in §1094.5]. We
need not now consider standards applicable to the findings of local or private agencies.
24 Cal. 3d at 346, 595 P.2d at 585, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 7. See note 5 supra.
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On the assumption that the Drummey, Laisne and Bixby line of authority is still viable, a proper question is whether new Section
1094.5(d) amounts to a statutory waiver of the rights a staff physician
would otherwise have against a hospital. Although there are circumstances where due process rights may be held to have been waived by
contract,153 Section 1094.5(d) is a statutory, not a consensual waiver.
Even if it had preceded Anton, it would have had no application to the
case, because if the relationship of Dr. Anton to the hospital were
viewed as a contract, the hospital bylaws, which would have been part
of the contract, assured the doctor he would receive "due process. '15 4
And if the contract had not assured due process or had expressly required a waiver of due process, the waiver could have been disregarded
as an adhesive provision violating the public policy of this state.'- 5
But there is a more fundamental reason why Section 1094.5(d) cannot be dismissed as a waiver. Anton characterizes staff membership as
a "fundamental" and "vested" right,'5 6 which it treats, in effect, as a
"property" or "liberty" right within the meaning of the due process
clauses. Whatever label is used, the right is one that Business and Professions Code Section 2392.5 requires the doctor to acquire before he
can practice in a hospital with a staff of five or more physicians, and it
further fixes some of the requirements of the hospital staff rules. But
the fact that the state provides for the creation of the right, let alone
that it requires its acquisition, does not mean that the state may attach
whatsoever conditions it pleases to the right. "[A] property entitlement
once created, cannot be limited in scope by procedural qualificathe state must carefully
tions."' 5 7 To avoid due process requirements
58
make clear that there is no entitlement.
153. Garfinkle v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 268, 282, 578 P.2d 925, 934, 146 Cal. Rptr. 208,

217 (1978).

154. Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 19 Cal. 3d 802, 812 n.6, 819 n.17, 829-30, 567
P.2d 1162, 1166 n.6, 1171 n.17, 1177-78, 140 Cal. Rptr. 442, 446 n.6, 451 n.17, 457-58 (1977).
155. Westlake Community Hosp. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 465,480-81,551 P.2d 410,419,
131 Cal. Rptr. 90, 99 (1976); see Ascherman v. San Francisco Medical Soc'y, 39 Cal. App. 3d 623,
649-50, 114 Cal. Rptr. 681, 697-98 (1974).
156. Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 19 Cal. 3d at 825, 567 P.2d at 1175, 140 Cal.
Rptr. at 445 (1977). See text accompanying notes 104-108 supra.

157. Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans Hosp., 537 F.2d 361,367 n.16 (9th Cir. 1976), citing Goss

v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-74 (1975); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §10-8, at 509-

10 (1978).
158. The fourteenth amendment places procedural constraints on the actions of government that work a deprivation of interests enjoying the stature of 'property' within the
meaning of the due process clause. Although the underlying substantive interest is cre-

ated by 'an independent source such as state law,' federal constitutional law determines
whether that interest rises to the level of a 'legitimate claim of entitlement' protected by
the due process clause.
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978). See also Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972) (no entitlement; refusal to rehire after termination of employment
contract that "made no provision for renewal whatsoever"); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §10-9, at 515 n.4 (1978).
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But the California legislature not only did not make the required
clarification of no entitlement, it refused to do so when it rejected the
proposed amendment to Business and Professions Code Section 2392.5,

have declared the rights under that section not to be
which would
15 9
"vested."

The deletion of the proposed amendment to Section

2392.5 by the Assembly, and passage of the bill amending only Code of
Civil Procedure Section 1094.5 is an indication that the legislature con-

sidered staff privileges a vested property right and chose to leave them
in that status. 160 Having left them as property rights, the legislature
could not then authorize any agency, public or private, to deprive the
holders of their rights without affording the holders due process, and if
due process requires the independent judgment of a superior court on

the evidence, Section 1049.5(d) is unconstitutional as to dismissals from
medical staffs although constitutional as to denials of initial appointments.
At a number of points Anton refers to "minimal due process" and
actually holds that "'minimal due process"' does not guarantee the

doctor a right to counsel before a hospital's judicial review committee.' 6 1 Transposing this into the language of the United States

Supreme Court, in Anton the right to counsel was not part of the process that was "due."' 162 From this one could try to argue that the right to

the independent judgment test was only part of "due process" but not
of "minimal due process." But since Anton elides rather than articu-

lates the distinction made in PinskerII between "due process" and the
"common law doctrine [of] . . .a 'fair procedure' 163 and holds that
the independent judgment review is required even though "the proceedings at the administrative [private hospital] level were conducted in
a manner consistent with the minimal requisites of fair procedure de-

manded by established common law principles," 1" such an argument
159. See text accompanying notes 109-111 supra.
160. Cf Laisne v. California State Bd. of Optometry, 19 Cal. 2d 831, 848, 123 P.2d 457, 467
(1942) (court referred to legislature's failure to adopt different procedures for reviewing private
board's decisions as evidence of constitutional limits on such action).
161. Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 19 Cal. 3d 802, 827, 567 P.2d 1162, 1177, 140
Cal. Rptr. 442, 457 (1977). See also id at 824-26, 567 P.2d at 1174-76, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 454-56.
162. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 12 (1978). "[D]ue process is
flexible.

.

.

,"

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).

163. Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soe'y of Orthodontists, 12 Cal. 3d 541, 550 n.7, 526 P.2d 253, 259
n.7, 116 Cal. Rptr. 245, 251 n.7 (1974). Compare id with Anton v. San Antonio Community
Hosp., 19 Cal. 3d 802, 825, 829-30, 567 P.2d 1162, 1175, 1178-79, 140 Cal. Rptr. 442, 455, 458-59
(1977).
164. 19 Cal. 3d at 830, 567 P.2d at 1179, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 459. Exactly opposite results have
been reached in New Jersey; the right to counsel was upheld, and the right to a court's independent judgment was denied. See Gareeb v. Weinstein, 161 N.J. Super, 1, -, 390 A.2d 706, 714
(1978). I am indebted to Mr. Joseph A. Saunders for this reference. This uncertainty is not resolved by the statement in CalfforniaDentalAssociationv. American Dental.4ssociation,23 Cal. 3d
346, 357, 590 P.2d 401, 407, 152 Cal. Rptr. 546, 552 (1979), "Anton was based on our application
of common law principles of fair procedure," because Dentaldid "not require the application of
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at this time does not seem to have great probability of success.
The proposition that the state cannot authorize a private agency to
deny a constitutional right helps to explain Ezekial v. Winkley. 65
Ezekial, a resident at a private hospital, successfully challenged his dismissal without being afforded his common law rights of "fair procedure," to which he was entitled to protect his alleged expectation that
completion of his residency would enable him fully to utilize his medical license by attaining some speciality status. The court cited Stre/en
v. Wadsworth Veterans Hospital,166 which on similar facts found no
showing that the resident could not continue in his medical specialty
and, therefore, that there was "no infringement of liberty and hence no
deprivation of due process on that account."' 67 But in Ezekial the
plaintiff alleged his "dismissal will effectively prevent his entry into the
medical specialty for which his residency training was preparing
him,"' 168 Le., he invoked the very liberty interest not found in Stretten.
And, if one takes Drummey at face value, as Bixby apparently does, a
interest is as much entitled to protection as a property interliberty
69
est. 1
THE CONTINUING INCONSISTENCY IN REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE

DECISIONS IN CALIFORNIA

Despite the misgivings one may have as to disciplinary processes in
hospitals and the general problems of peer review within the medical
profession, 70 it seems ridiculous even to suggest the conclusion that a
statute as well-intended and apparently harmless as Section 1094.5(d)
is in any way unconstitutional. The vice in the suggestion is, however,
not the result of fallacious reasoning; it is one result of the schizoid
character of California administrative law-a consequence of its split
personality. The split is the difference in review afforded denials of
applications and that given to revocations. Bixby is as clear an illustration as has been found:
[The courts... consider... whether... such a fundamental
right ...is possessed by, and vested in, the individual or merely
sought by him. In the latter case, since the administrative agency
must engage in the delicate task of determining whether the individcommon law principles of fair procedure." Thus whether the principles are common law, constitutional, or even extra-constitutional, see note 126 supra, did not have to be considered.
165. 20 Cal. 3d 267, 572 P.2d 32, 142 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1977).
166. 537 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1976).
167. Id at 366 (property interest found and held adequately protected).
168. Ezekial v. Winkley, 20 Cal.3d 267, 278, 572 P.2d 32, 39, 142 Cal. Rptr. 418, 425 (1977).
169. Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 138, 481 P.2d 242, 247, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 239 (1971).

170. See, e.g., Westlake Community Hosp. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 465, 486, 551 P.2d
410, 423, 131 Cal. Rptr. 90, 103 (1976); J. BERI.ANT, PRoF.ssioN AND MONOPOLY 85-89 (1975).
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ual qualifies for the sought right, the courts have deferred to the administrative expertise of the agency. If, however, the right has been
acquired by the individual, and if the right is fundamental, the courts
have held the loss of it is sufficiently vital to the individual to compel
a full and independent review. The abrogation of the right is too
important to the individual to relegate it to exclusive administrative

extinction....
Once the agency has initially exercised its expertise and deter-

mined that an individual fulfills the requirements to practice his profession, the agency's subsequent revocation of the license calls for an

independent judgment
review of the facts underlying any such ad17 1
ministrative decision.

Why should administrative expertise be the subject of deference in
the application cases and not in the revocation cases? There is no point
in reviewing the truisms that the professional information and responsibility do not differ in the two situations. That question was put by the
late Dean McGovney almost four decades ago, 172 and many times
since, 173 but it has never been answered.
The California court invokes in support of its position Professor
Jaffe's language about protecting "'mavericks and unconventional
practitioners.' "17 Jaffe concluded that "it would not be easy to draft
or apply a single formula" for judicial review, because the competence,
composition and processes of administrative agencies vary so widely.
Instead the California court has developed a single formula applied a
priori without regard to the character of the agency and the subject
matter involved. It has fallen into the pit of declaring a "Ojludicial categorization [that] will generally carry with it an inevitable ultimate conclusion. . . the danger that through [the] use of labels the underlying
171. Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 144, 146,481 P.2d 242,252,254-55, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234,244,
246-47 (1971).
172. McGovney, Administrative Decisionsand CourtReview Thereof in California,29 CALIF.
L. REV. 110, 131-34 (1941).
173. Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 161, 481 P.2d 242, 264, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 256 (1971)
(Mosk, J., concurring) (suggesting that the right of a qualified applicant is as "vested or fundamental" as the right of a holder of a license); Southern Cal. Jockey Club v. California Horse
Racing Bd., 36 Cal. 2d 167, 180, 223 P.2d 1, 9 (1950) (Traynor, J., dissenting) ("a double standard
for a single problem"); Beverly Hills Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Superior Court, 259 Cal. App. 2d
306, 315, 66 Cal. Rptr. 183, 186 (1968) ("the practical results [are] identical"); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §10-9, at 519 (1978) ("inconsistent with any intelligible rational underlying due process protection. ... ); Note, Judiciaiiy Compelled-4dmissionto Medical Societies
The Falcone Case, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1186, 1198 (1962) ("From the standpoint of the seriousness
of the injury to the individual, there is no real basis for a distinction between expulsion and
exclusion where in either case nonmembership seriously impairs one's ability to pursue an occupation,"); Note, De Novo fudicialReview of State Administrative Findings, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1217,
1222 (1952) (the distinction between application and revocation cases "showed superficial logic").
174. Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 145, 146 n.18, 161,481 P.2d 242,253,254 n.18, 256,93 Cal.
Rptr. 234, 245, 246 n.18, 256 (1971), citing L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION 191-92 (1965).
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factors may be neglected.""17 What in Jaffe's book appears to be an
attempted rationalization of the California rule has in Bixby been construed as an endorsement.
What has been subordinated is, of course, the inability of judges to
make better decisions on matters of medicine than doctors. Despite the
various laudations of administrative expertise and recognition of the
need for hospitals to attempt to protect themselves from malpractice
suits,'76 the California court still feels that it must protect professional
practitioners "from untoward intrusions by the massive apparatus of
government" and private entities,' 77 and that the way to guard against
"administrative evil" is to allow only courts to exercise "the conclusiveness of the factfinding" power. 78 The court still seems to fail to appreciate that an administrative agency may be the servant of the public
rather than the enemy of a licensee. A "maverick" hospital that disciplines a deficient doctor may do so to assure the quality of care to patients. This "maverick and unconventional" hospital may be as much
deserving of protection as an individual practitioner. Why should the
legislature be denied the opportunity to decide that it is so deserving?
One might be disposed to say that there has been no change between
now and the 40 years since Drummey, but there has been. Although
the words are different, the song is the same except now it is sung by the
"liberals" rather than the "conservatives."'' 79 Under the attractive
mantle of protecting individual rights, the present "liberals" seem to
have adopted the attitudes of judicial activism their predecessors decried when those attitudes were used to protect "outmoded rights of
property and . . .shibboleths of freedom of contract."' 80 When the

court speaks of "arbitrary power" it refers only to that exercised by "a
personal monarch" or "impersonal multitude" or "contemporaneous
and fluid majority."''
Judicial omphaloskepsis might reveal one con175. Note, De Novo JudicialReview of State Administrative Findings, 65 HARV. L. REv. 1217,
1221 (1952). Jaffe cites this note, but in Bixby Jaffe's notes are omitted.
176. Ezekial v. Winkley, 20 Cal. 3d 267, 277-78 572 P.2d 32, 39, 142 Cal. Rptr. 418, 425 (1977);
Westlake Community Hosp. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 465, 486, 551 P.2d 410, 423, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 90, 103 (1976); Ascherman v. San Francisco Medical Soc'y, 39 Cal. App. 3d 623, 643, 114
Cal. Rptr. 681, 693 (1974); McGovney, The Caifornia Chaos in Court Review of the Decisions of
State Administrative Agencies, 15 S. CAL. L. REV. 391, 410-11 (1942); Note, Judical, Compelled
Admission to MedicalSocieties: The Falcone Case, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1186, 1194 (1962).
177. Ezekial v. Winkley, 20 Cal. 3d 267, 272, 572 P.2d 32, 35, 142 Cal. Rptr. 418, 421 (1977);
Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 143, 481 P.2d 242, 251, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 243 (1971).
178. Laisne v. California State Bd. of Optometry, 19 Cal. 2d 831, 846, 123 P.2d 457, 466

(1942).
179. Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 159, 481 P.2d 242, 263, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 255 (1971)
(Burke, J., dissenting).
180. Id at 142,481 P.2d at 250,93 Cal. Rptr. at 242; Grey, Do WelHavean Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV.703, 711, 717-18 (1975).
181. 4 Cal. 3d at 141 & n.8, 481 P.2d at 249-50 & n.8, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 241-42 & n.8.
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spicuous item that has been omitted.182
THE

DERIVATION OF "FUNDAMENTAL VESTED RIGHTS"

Anton held that the independent judgment rule applied because the
private hospital's decision substantially affected a "fundamental vested
right."'81 3 Obvious questions are: (1) is there such a concept as an "unfundamental unvested" right that the courts protect;1 4 (2) where does
the expression "fundamental vested right" come from; and (3) is a
"fundamental vested right" anything different than a constitutional
right of liberty or property?
The short conventional response to the first question is that in Bixby.
Relying on McDonough v. Goodcell,8 5 which "drew a line between the

review of an agency decision affecting restoration of a license and the
attempted acquisition of such a right," the court says "the attempt to
obtain a license did not involve a fundamental, vested right .

. 186

But this conventional response is no answer. Justice Mosk, concurring
in Bixby, put the question more poignantly: why should a licensee be

treated better than an applicant who "is equally well qualified by virtue
of his investment of time and treasure[?]" 187 Although the question has
been put in other forms such as the inexplicable difference between

"administrative" action in granting a license and "judicial" action in
189
revoking one,""' no one has ever been able to give a rational answer.

Justice Mosk tries to soften the bluntness of this fact by saying that the
distinction "arises primarily because of chronology ....

,,190 Behind

these innocent appearing words lurks a bit of California legal history
that shows why a rational answer is impossible.
It is easier to explain the genesis of the McDonough distinction than
its longevity. The McDonough brothers had been in the bail bond
182. Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Ass'n, 11 Cal. 3d 28, 58, 520 P.2d
29, 49-50, 112 Cal. Rptr. 805, 825-26 (1974) (Roth, J., dissenting); R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY 257 n.38 (1977) ("Unquenchable judicial thirst for extra constitutional power").
183. Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 19 Cal. 3d 802, 822, 567 P.2d 1162, 1173, 140
Cal. Rptr. 442, 453 (1977).
184. "[R]ights, if any, which may be tolerantly regarded as non-fundamental and not vested"
Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Ass'n, 11 Cal. 3d 28, 58, 520 P.2d 29, 50,
112 Cal. Rptr. 805, 826 (1974) (Roth, J., dissenting).
185. 13 Cal. 2d 741, 91 P.2d 1035 (1939).
186. Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 139, 481 P.2d 242, 248, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 240 (1971)
(emphasis in original).
187. Id at 161, 481 P.2d at 264, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 256.
188. See text accompanying notes 171-173 supra.
189. See, e.g., Southern Cal. Jockey Club, Inc. v. California Horse Racing Bd., 36 Cal. 2d 167,
180-82, 223 P.2d 1, 10-11 (1950) (Traynor, J., dissenting); Beverly Hills Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Superior Court, 259 Cal. App. 2d 306, 315-16, 66 Cal. Rptr. 183, 186-87 (1968); McGovney, Administrative Decisions and Court Review Thereof, in Caifornia,29 CALIF. L. REV. 110, 132, 149
(1941).
190. Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 161, 481 P.2d 242, 264, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 256 (1971)
(Mosk, J., concurring).
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business in San Francisco for some thirty years. In 1936-37 they became the subjects of an investigation by the grand jury circumspectly
described in the superseded opinion of the District Court of Appeal as:
"held to determine if certain police officers were levying and collecting
graft fees from certain businesses. The investigation was much discussed in the municipality and many items appeared in the public
press."'' The "businesses" so delicately mentioned were largely prosof
titution, including an "asserted monopoly on medical examination 192
women arrested by the police vice squad," and organized gambling.
And the press accounts included the whole of the lurid "Atherton Report," which characterized the firm of McDonough Brothers as "a
fountain head of corruption willing to interest itself in almost any matter designed to defeat or circumvent the law."'193 The degree of public
agitation can be inferred from the fact that almost forty-one years later
"The Fountain Head of Corruption" was an expression that could still
tingle in the popular ear.194
The legislative response to this furor was the passage of the Bail
Bond Act, 195 which required bail bond brokers to obtain licenses although the business had theretofore been unregulated. Licenses were
to be issued only to one whom the Insurance Commissioner found to
be "a fit and proper person to engage in such business."' 196 "The Bail
Bond Act was drafted by, and introduced and sponsored in the Legislature by, The State Bar of California."' 197 What was not expressly said
but what can be inferred from subsequent litigation is that the Bail
Bond Act was passed to put McDonough Brothers out of business.
"[W]hen McDonough appeared before a jury in an extraordinary proceeding, [sic] matter or in a criminal case based upon the 'license' question, McDonough won, and when matters of 'license' appeared before
the commissioner, the commissioner won."'198 From the temper of the
191. McDonough v. Goodcell, 84 P.2d 231, 285 (1939) (superseded opinion).
192. San Francisco Chronicle, March 17, 1937, at IF-8F (special section).
193. For a full text of Atherton's Graft Report, see San Francisco Chronicle, March 17, 1937,
at 2F, col. 3 (special section). Edwin Newton Atherton, a colorful figure in his own right, was the
investigator for the grand jury.
194. Herb Caen, San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 15, 1978, Sunday Punch, at 1, col. 1.
195. CAL. INS. CODE §§1800-1822.
196. McDonough v. Goodcell, 13 Cal. 2d 741, 743-44, 91 P.2d 1035, 1037 (1939).
197. Golden, The BailBondAct, 13 CAL. ST. BJ. 9 (1938).
193. McDonough v. Garrison, 68 Cal. App. 2d 318, 359, 156 P.2d 983, 1004 (1945) (Ward, J.,
dissenting). The immediately accessible information on the McDonough litigation in chronological order follows: In re McDonough, 27 Cal. App. 2d 155, 80 P.2d 485 (1938) (denying habeas
corpus following indictment for conspiracy to violate the Bail Bond Act and holding act constitutional); In re Rice, 27 Cal. App. 2d 768, 80 P.2d 491 (1938) (denying habeas corpus to McDonough employee); Golden, The Bail BondAct, 13 CAL- ST. B.J. 9 (1938) (Superior Court opinion
overruling demurrer to conspiracy indictment); McDonough v. Goodcell, 84 P.2d 281 (1938) (superseded opinion of District Court of Appeal granting writ of mandate against the commissioner);
Newport v. Caminetti, 56 Cal. App. 2d 557, 132 P.2d 897 (1943) (upholding denial of license to
husband of McDonoughs' niece, a "dummy"); McDonough v. Garrison, 68 Cal. App. 2d 318, 156
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times it seems clear that there is no way the McDonoughs could have
obtained a license and that the Supreme Court was bent on accommo-

dating this temper. If such accommodation could be achieved by an ad
hominem per curiam opinion drawing an artifical distinction between
applicants and licensees, so be it.199 But why has a distinction with

such a sinister background remained so viable? No comprehensible
answer to this question has ever been given. This void may be an illus-

tration of the philosopher's proposition:
What can be said at all can be said clearly; and whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent. °
The explanation of the source of "fundamental vested rights" is less

colorful and rather complicated, but it may show how something may
come from nothing, an example of legal abiogenesis. The expression
"fundamental vested right" got its currency from Bixby and Strum-

sky. 20 1 The origin of "fundamental" in the present context is tolerably
clear. Except for its discriminating use three decades ago to distinguish
between fundamental constitutional rights and the limitations of the
judiciary clause of the state constitution,20 2 the word does not seem to
have been used relative to the scope of judicial review until it appeared
in Bixby.20 3
The origin of "vested" is more obscure and requires some tracing.
Bixby cites two cases that refer to effect on "vested rights" as the crite-

rion for applying the "independent judgment" scope of judicial review.2°4 Though the cited cases give the impression that the earlier
cases, Drummey, McDonough, Laisne, Dare, etc. distinguish between
P.2d 983 (1945) (reversing grant of mandate against commissioner after jury "trial de novo" on
review of denial of subsequent application for license).

199. "In other situations there is no discernible reason for the unsigned opinion; i.e., the case is
one that ordinarily would be decided with an opinion by a disclosed author and concurring justices. But intense public and partisan interest in the outcome, or the difficulty of reaching agreement on a particular draft opinion, may make anonymity the only way to achieve unanimity." B.
WITKIN, MANUAL ON APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS §130 at 254 (1977), noted in Kanner, Book

Review, 25 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 893, 902 (1978).
200. L. Wittgenstein, as quotedin F. HuxLEY, THE RAVEN AND THE WRITING DESK 9 (1976).

201. Bixby v. Piero, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 144, 481 P.2d 242, 252, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 244 (1971);
Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Ass'n, 11 Cal. 3d 28, 34, 520 P.2d 29,32-33,
112 Cal. Rptr. 805, 808-09 (1974) ("Vested, fundamental rights").
202. Modem Barber College v. California Employment Stabilization Comm'n, 31 Cal. 2d 720,
726, 192 P.2d 916, 919 (1948).
203. The majority opinion herein unfortunately enhances the confusion and uncertainty
If the
of earlier cases by introducing the further concept of 'fundamental' rights ....
single-factor 'vested rights' test has led to confusion and anomaly, consider the difficulties.

. .

in applying this new test ....

Bixby v. Piero, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 153, 481 P.2d 242, 259, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 251 (1971) (Burke, J.,
dissenting).
204. Id at 144, 481 P.2d at 252, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 244, citing Merrill v. Department of Motor
Vehicles, 71 Cal. 2d 907, 914-15, 458 P.2d 33, 37, 80 Cal. Rptr. 89, 93 (1969) and Beverly Hills
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Superior Court, 259 Cal. App. 2d 306, 314-17, 66 Cal. Rptr. 183, 186-87
(1968).
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"vested" and "non-vested" rights, they do not. Drummey, the first case
to require the independent judgment review in a mandamus proceeding to secure the restoration of an occupational license, refers to "constitutional rights," deprivation "of an existing valuable privilege," and
quotes the United States Supreme Court on the involvement of" 'constitutional rights of liberty and property.' "205
McDonough, the first case to distinguish between applications and
revocations, holds that "[t]he legislature has the power to vest in a public officer the discretion to deny an application," which it thereafter
characterizes as an "administrative" function with which it will not interfere if the officer's action, like the action of a court, was based on
substantial evidence.2 "6 McDonough distinguished Drummey by pointing out that the petitioners in Drummey "were possessed of licenses,
. . . which were recognized to be valuable property rights" that federal
due process protected by requiring the "independent judgment on the
facts" of some court or other body exercising "judicial functions. 20 7
Although McDonough refers to "constitutional rights" and "due process," it does not use the word "vested" except for the inapposite use
stated above.20 8 Laisne, another revocation case, quotes a concurring
opinion of the late Chief Justice Beatty to the effect that the facts on
which "[viested rights of property or contract" depend can be decided
only by courts, and adds some similar language, but it actually turns on
the reiteration of Drummey and its own extension of the due process
clause of the state constitution to protect "a property right."20 9 Dare, a
revocation case, cites Drummey and similarly refers to deprivation "of
a constitutional right either of liberty or property."2 10 Section 1094.5 is
2 I but the Tenth Biennial Report of the
largely a codification of Dare,
Judicial Council of California (1944), which is generally considered the
205. Drummey v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors, 13 Cal. 2d 75, 84-85, 87 P.2d 848, 853-54
(1939).
206. McDonough v. Goodeell, 13 Cal. 2d 741, 746, 91 P.2d 1035, 1039 (1939).

The testimony before the commissioner was voluminous and highly conflicting...
[and] would sustain a conclusion either way ....

If the trial had been before a court the

evidence was sufficient to support findings... [of] a verdict either way ....

With this

state of the record our inquiry on this phase of the case is at an end....
Id at 749, 91 P.2d at 1040.
207. Id at 752-53, 91 P.2d at 1042.
208. See text accompanying note 206 supra.
209. Laisne v. California State Bd. of Optometry, 19 Cal. 2d 831, 836, 838, 846-47, 123 P.2d

457, 461, 462, 466 (1942).
210. Dare v. Board of Medical Examiners, 21 Cal. 2d 790, 795, 136 P.2d 304, 306 (1943).
211. Beverly Hills Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Superior Court, 259 Cal. App. 2d 306, 314, 66
Cal. Rptr. 183, 186 (1968); TENrH BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 140-41 and n.60; Netterville, JudicialReview- The "Independent Judgment" 4nomaly, 44 CALIF. L. REv. 262, 267-68
(1956).
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authoritative legislative history of the section, 2 12 has not been found to

contain any reference to either "fundamental" or "vested" rights.213
Thus it seems safe to say that the current expression was not used

before the enactment of Section 1094.5 in 1945.
The use of "vested" and "non-vested" as a test to determine the
scope of judicial review of administrative determinations of fact ap-

pears to have begun in 1950. Mr. Ralph N. Kleps, the principal draftsman of Section 1094.5 analyzed McDonough v. Goodcell under the
caption: "State-wide Agencies Whose Decisions Do Not Involve Vested
Rights," and said, "[A]nother class of state-wide agencies which is exempted from the operation of the Standard Oil and Drummey cases
includes those whose decisions are said to involve matters of privilege,
rather than vested right. 21 4 But he gave no clue as to who said this or
where or when. The one case he cites that uses the word "vested" does

so in the context of holding that a probationary public employee had
only a statutory right, not a constitutional right, to continued employment and was, therefore, not entitled to an independent judgment re-

view of his dismissal. 1 5
The distinction between a "vested right" and a "privilege" does not
seem to have survived.21 6 In 1952 the court refused to apply the

"vested right"/"privilege" distinction and held that an applicant for a

form of gambling license was entitled to a hearing on denial even
though he had no "vested right" to engage in such a business. 2 17 Nor
212. Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 19 Cal. 3d 802, 817, 567 P.2d 1162, 1170, 140
Cal. Rptr. 442, 450 (1977).
213. No reference to the MeDonough litigation has been found in the Report except to the
collateral case of Newport v. Caminetti,56 Cal. App. 2d 557, 132 P.2d 897 (1943). See note 198
supra; TENTH BxE1'iAL REPORT, supra note 28 at 142 n.66.
214. Kleps, CertiorarfedMandamus: Court Review of Caifornia Administrative Decisions
1939-49, 2 STAN. L. REv. 285, 293 (1950). See also id at 294-96.
215. Boutwell v. State Bd. of Equalization, 94 Cal. App. 2d 945, 950, 212 P.2d 20, 23 (1949),
citedin Kleps, Certiorarfed.Mandamus: Court Review of CaliforniaAdministrativeDecisions193949, 2 STAN. L. Rav. 285, 296 n.39 (1950). Compare Pipkin v. Board of Supervisors, 82 Cal. App.
3d 652, 660-62, 147 Cal. Rptr. 502, 507-08 (1978) (permanent public employee has no "property
right" to employment under federal constitution but, nevertheless, has "a fundamental vested
right" entitling him to independent judgment review).
216. Note, De Novo JudicialReview of State Administrative Findings, 65 HARV. L. REv. 1217,
1221-22 (1952). This note gives the impression that McDonough v. Goodcellexpressly turned on a
distinction between "rights" and privileges and criticizes it for doing so. In fact, McDonough
refers to "privileges" only in rejecting an argument that the Bail Bond Act was expostfacto and
not in considering the scope of review. 13 Cal. 2d 741, 750, 91 P.2d 1035, 1041 (1939). The demise
of the distinction between "rights" and "privileges" is beyond the scope of this article, but see
Boardof Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 n.9 (1972).
217. Fascination, Inc. v. Hoover, 39 Cal. 2d 260, 270-71, 246 P.2d 656, 662 (1952). McDonough is so cryptic that there was for some time some doubt whether there was any judicial review
of denials of applications. McGovney, AdministrativeDecisionsand Court Review Thereof,in California, 29 CALIF. L. Rnv.110, 132 (1941); McGovney, The California Chaosin Court Review of
Decisionsof StateAdministrativeAgencies, 15 S.CAL. L. Rlv. 390, 401, 411 (1942). "The court, in
Fascination,emphatically rejected the distinction between vested rights and privileges as a relevant criterion in this context [right to hearing on denial of application]," CoNTiNuiNG EDUCATION OF THE BAR,CALIFORNiA ADMINISTRATrvE MANDAmUS §2.5 (1966).
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did they quickly adopt Mr. Kleps' characterization of "vested." Later
in 1952 the court spoke of deprivation of a "property right" as the criterion for determining the scope of review.218 But in 1954 Mr. Witkin
adopted Mr. Kleps' terminology by using it in the first edition of California Procedure. He wrote:
A party whose vested right is affected by the agency's order, e.g., by
suspension or revocation of a business or professional license, may
have something in the nature of a judicial trial de novo on the facts
... . But where no vested right is affected, e.g., where the aggrieved
party is an unlicensed person whose application for a license has
been denied, there is no right to a trial de novo.219
And in 1955 the court held that applicants for old age benefits were not
entitled to a "trial de novo," because "they were not possessed of a
vested right. '12 ° This seems to be the judicial debut of "vested" in the
present context. Mr. Kleps then repeated his use of "vested" in describing McDonough,22 1 and Professor Jaffe, discussing California cases
such as jlfcDonough and Drummey, refered to "the determination of a
vested right" but did not give the source of his quotation.222 The effective source of the present currency of "vested" seems to be its use by
Judge Deering in CaliforniaAdministrative Mandamus in 1966 where
he defines it circularly, perhaps as a counsel of despair, as a "[t]ype of
right granted special constitutional protections. 2 2 3 If a right is
"vested" because it is given special protection rather than being specially protected because it is "vested," it seems that the word states a
result rather than a reason and its use is descriptive rather than analytical.
The first extensive judicial discussion of "vested" and "nonvested" is
Beverl Hills FederalSavings andLoanAssociation v. Superior Court, 24
which understandably but erroneously attributes its origin to McDonough.22 5 The dichotomy was used by the California Supreme Court in
218. Thomas v. California Employment Stabilization Comm'n, 39 Cal. 2d 501, 504, 247 P.2d
561, 562 (1952).
219. 3 B. WIrKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Extraordinary Writs §16 (1954) (citing 2 STAN. L.
REV. 285, 294). See also id §19.
220. Bertch v. Social Welfare Dep't, 45 Cal. 2d 524, 529, 289 P.2d 485, 488-89 (1955).
221. Kleps, CertiorarfedMandamusReviewed- The Courts and CalforniaAdministrativeDeclsions-1949-1959, 12 STAN. L. REv. 554, 565-66 (1960).
222. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 191 (1965).
223. CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUS xxii,

§§5.69-5.72 (1966).
224. 259 Cal. App. 2d 306, 312-16, 66 CaL Rptr. 183, 185-87 (1968).
225. The court distinguished the Drummey decision on the ground that Drummey involved the revocation of a license, a vested right, and the revocation process was a 'udicial' one, whereas the McDonough case involved a denial of a permit, a nonvested right,
and, apparently for that reason, an administrative rather than a judicial act.
Id at 315, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
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Merrill v. Department of Motor Vehicles,2 26 which relied on Beverly
22 7 Mr.
Hills and the first edition of Witkin's California Procedure.
Witkin in his second edition, of course, was then able to cite Merrill as
citing his own prior text. 228 Thus he had the pleasure of reaping the
fruit after cultivating the plant.22 9
Is there a difference between "fundamental vested rights" and constitutional rights of liberty and property? If there is, it has not become
apparent. The expression "fundamental vested" seems to be no more
than the coupling of exalting adjectives to provide a rhetorical foundation for the results the court has reached. Every effort to define the
expression becomes as circular as Judge Deering's effort to define
"vested" alone. All the coupling does is add a little panache to the
opinions.

A

SHORT CODA

California administrative law is riddled with enigmas and paradoxes
some of which I have sought to explain, some I have hinted at, and
some I have not mentioned. The following personal catalogue is offered by way of illustration without in any way purporting to be definitive. (1) The intransigeant adherence to the "independent judgment"
rule, indeed its expansion, as shown in Bixby and Strumsky based
solely on the source of the agency's authority rather than its competence. (2) The persistent distinction between denials of licenses and
revocation of licenses that can be explained, but not on rational
grounds. (3) The preference for the judgment of an individual superior
court judge rather than for the collegial opinion of an appellate court
based on the identical record,23 0 which may be explainable as a rule of
judicial convenience but not of common sense. (4) The problems latent
in what is now Code of Civil Procedure Section 1094.5(e) (formerly (d))
relative to taking evidence before the superior court because such evidence could not have been obtained before a private body without subpoena power." 1 If Tex-Cal is the law, the absence of compulsory
226. 71 Cal. 2d 907, 458 P.2d 33, 80 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1969).
227. Id. at 915 n.12, 458 P.2d at 37-38 n.12, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 93 n.12.
228. 5 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Extraordinary Writs §217. See also Id. §222 (2d
ed. 1971).
229. Cf. Kanner, Book Review, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 893, 894 (1978) ("selectively chosen expressions of others in Mr. Witlin's skillful hands become transformed into a sort of Charlie McCarthy device which, while appearing to have a life of its own, in fact voices Mr. Witkin's own

predilictions.").
230. Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 143 n.10, 481 P.2d 242, 251 n.10, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 243
n.10 (1971).
231. See Ezekial v. Winldey, 20 Cal. 3d 267, 278, 572 P.2d 32, 39, 142 Cal. Rptr. 418, 425
(1977). Compare id with Netterville, JudicialReview: The "Independent Judgment"Anomaly, 44
CALIF. L. REV. 262, 270-77 (1956).
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process before a private body presents a particular problem. Tex-Cal
predicates the availability of the substantial evidence review of administrative action on "ample safeguards of fair procedure at the adminis' and excuses the retention of the independent judgment
trative level,"232
review as a device "to cure due process violations at the administrative
level." '33 Since compulsory process may be necessary to assure crossexamination and confrontation, for example, it is possible to foresee a
result where, contrary to the former case law,2 34 the review of actions of
private bodies may be more extensive than the review of those of public
agencies. Playing Anton and Tex-Cal back to back may thus create a
new incongruity in lieu of the one Anton purported to eliminate. (5)
Anton's holding that the physician had no right to counsel before the
hospital board opens the whole area of the appositeness of the adversary process to such hearings. Considering that staff membership is
said to be in part, at least, a device to insure the continuing education
of doctors, are hearings before such boards going to have to be characterized as "disciplinary" or "educational" in order to determine what
kind of process is "due?" '35 (6) Since Bixby acknowledges that "fundamental vested" "yields no fixed formula and guarantees no predictably
exact ruling in each case," '36 "an enormous proportion of California
litigation is going to be devoted to the somewhat futile task of deciding
237
what rights are fundamental and what rights are not fundamental."
This exercise is proceeding as predicted. 38 (7) What are the "common
law principles of fair procedure," and to what extent may the legislature alter them? These questions could be put with reference to particular procedural aspects. As Anton shows, one may conclude that the
right to counsel before the administrative body is of lesser stature than
the right to an "independent judgment review." And Anton leaves in
doubt the question of whether the burden of proof can be shifted to the
respondent.239
The constitutional nouns "liberty" and "property" are elastic and
imprecise. The California court has obscured rather than clarified
them by adding its meliorative adjectives "fundamental and vested."
But these are ecumenical times, and perhaps baptism in a turbid pool is
232. 24 Cal. 3d 335, 346, 595 P.2d 579, 585, 156 Cal. Rptr. 1, 7 (1979).
233. Id. at 344, 595 P.2d at 584, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
234. See notes 12-14 and accompanying text supra.
235. Board of Curators, Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 86-91 (1978).
236. 4 Cal. 3d at 146-47, 481 P.2d at 254, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
237. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW AND GOVERNMENT §68, at 70 (2d ed. 1975).
238. Kilpatrick's Bakeries v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 77 Cal. App. 3d 539, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 664 (1978) (is typical); G.B. v. Lackner, 80 Cal. App. 3d 64, 145 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1978) (is
titillating). But see note 8 and accompanying text supra.
239. Pipkin v. Board of Supervisors, 82 Cal. App. 3d 652, 658, 147 Cal. Rptr. 502, 505 (1978).
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as good as that in a clear one, and since I have already invoked Ben
Gurion and the Pentateuch, I shall now call on my favorite Anglican
cleric, the late Reverend Sydney Smith, and apply his words to the
court:
I shall pray for your salvation but with no very lively hope of success.
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